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Nature of the Problem 
Manpower problems have received increasing attention 
in recent years. Numerous projects and programs have been 
directed toward improving the employment prospects of 
disadvantaged individuals. The success of these projects 
and programs in alleviating the rather bleak job outlook of 
the disadvantaged individual has been the subject of 
considerable debate and analysis. 1 There does appear to be 
some general consensus, however, that there is a need for 
increased participation by the private.sector of the 
economy in the overall manpower program. 2 
The need for greater involvement of private business 
in the carrying out of an effective manpower program for 
1For an excellent summary and evaluation of programs 
legislated during the 1960's, see Garth L. Mangum, The 
Emergence of Manpower Policy (New York: Holt, Rinehart, 
and Winston, Inc., 1969), pp. 103-61. 
2Robert A. Gordon, "Introduction," in Toward a 
Manpower Policy, ed. by Robert A. Gordon (New York: John 
Wiley and Sons, 1967), p. 5. Also see, National Industrial 
Conference Board, Education, Training, and Emp1oyme·nt of 
the Disadvantaged, Studies in Public Affairs, No. 4 (New 
York: National Industrial Conference Board,· 1969), p. 2. 
1 
2 
disadvantaged_ individuald has led to discussions of the 
problem of how to encourage such participation. Various 
. 3 
financial incentives have been suggested and discussed. 
An incentive identified as the Work Incentive Program Credit 
. has recently been legislated. 4 Under the Work Incentive 
Program Credit, employers are entitled to a credit against 
their income tax of 20 percent of the first 12 months' wages 
paid to employees certified by the Secretary of Labor as 
eligible for tax credit employment. Therefore, if a tax 
credit employee is paid $5,000 during his first year of 
employment, a $1,000 credit would be.available as an offset 
against the employer's tax liability. This type of credit 
is similar to the investment tax credit which was originally 
enacted in 1962. However, a human resource tax credit such 
as the work incentive tax credit is directed toward encour-
aging increased investment in people rather than property. 
Prior to enactment of the work incentive tax credit, 
tax credits on investment in human resources were proposed 
in several different versions of the Human Investment Act 
introduced _in the U.S. Congress. A 1969 version of the 
Act proposed that employers be granted a credit against 
3For example, see U.S. Department of Labor, Manpower 
Administration, A Government Commitment to Occu ational 
·Training in Industry Washington., D.C.: Government Printing 
Office, August, 1968), pp. 77-90. 
4commerce Clearing House, Inc., Explanation of Revenue 
Act of 1971 (Chicago: Commerce Clearing House, Inc., 1971), 
pp. 60-62. 
3 
their income tax for an amount equal to 10 percent of 
training period wages and other specified training costs, 
. . 5 
e.g., tuition. 
A human resource tax credit was also recommended by the 
Advisory Panel on Private Enterprise in its report to the 
National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (Kerner 
. . ) 6 Commission . Below are some of the statements pertinent to 
the tax credit approach which the Advisory Panel included in 
its report to the Kerner Commission: 
We are convinced that large numbers and many 
different types of business and industrial com-
panies will participate in hiring and training 
the hard-core unemployed only if an incentive 
technique is devised which is as simple and 
automatic as possible ...• 
We believe that the single most powerful 
inducement for broad involvement of private 
enterprise in job training and job development 
lies in the use of a tax incentive •••• 
An advantage of the tax credit route is that 
only companies which are profitable and therefore 
owe Federal income tax are eligible for the incen-
tive credit. Profitable companies are in the best 
position to provide meaningful and continuing 
employment.7 
5u.s. Congress, Senate, 9lst Cong., 1st sess., February 
17, 1969, Congressional Record, CXV, 2423. Earlier 
versions of the 1969 Act were intr-oduced in 1965, 1966, and 
1967. Each version of the Human Investment Act was referred 
to the appropriate Congressional Committee where no further 
action was taken. For an expanded discussion of the 
different versions of this Act see infra, pp. 14-16 • 
. 6Report of.the National Advisory Commission on Civil 
Disorders, Otto Kerner, Chairman (New York: The New York 
Times Company, 1968), pp. 558-69. 
7rbid., pp. 564-66. 
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Although the Human Investment Act proposed a tax credit 
on specified training costs in addition to wages, the 
Advisory Panel proposed a tax credit based only on wages. 
The work incentive credit is similar to the Advisory Panel's 
proposal. However, the work incentive credit is only 20 
percent of the. first 12 month's wages, whereas the Advisory 
Panel proposed a 75 percent tax credit on the wages paid 
eligible employees during the first six months of their 
employment, a 50 percent credit on the wages paid such 
employees during the second six months of their employment, 
and a 25 percent credit on the second year's wages. 
The above discussion indicates a difference of opinion 
on what should be included in tax credit legislation aimed 
at encouraging expanded employment and training in private 
industry. ·There has been little empirical research, 
however, to support or refute the contention of tax credit 
proponents that this is the type of financial incentive 
preferred by business. Nor has there been significant 
empirical research directed specifically to questions 
concerning the tax credit rate, base structure, and 
potential effect. 
Purpose of Study 
This study was undertaken in order to gain insight 
into the attitudes of employers on the nature and potential 
effectiveness of a human resource tax credit to encourage 
expanded employment and training by private industry. 
5 
Information was sought on the feasibility and potential 
effect of including in the tax credit.base education costs, 
relocation expenses, and wa.ges paid individuals certified 
by local employment security offices as being eligible for 
tax credit employment. In addition, an attempt was made to 
determine the magnitude of the credit rate necessary to 
affect the employer's decision to hire, relocate, and 
provide educational opportunities for disadvantaged 
individuals. 
Finally, employers' estimates of the effect of a wage 
tax credit on their employment were sought in order to have 
a basis for estimating the potential effect of ·a human 
resource tax credit on the nation's employment and on tax 
revenue. 
Organization of Study 
This introductory chapter .outlines the nature of the 
problem investigated in this study; the purpose, organ-
ization, sign~ficance, and limitations of the study; and 
a clarification of terms used in the. study. A second 
chapter outlines the work incentive tax credit and other 
human resource tax credits which have been proposed. Pro 
and con arguments on the use of a human resource tax credit 
are also summarized in this chapter. The third chapter 
contains a discussion of the research methodology. 
Inc::luded. in·this chapter is a discussion of the research 
population and samples, a description of the<0.ata collection 
6 
procedures, and a discussion of the type of analyses to 
which the survey data were subjected. 
The attitudes of employers toward the tax credit 
approach are examined in the fourth chapter. The data· 
presented in this chapter provide insight into the foJlowing 
questions: 
1. What type of financial incentive for employing 
and training disadvantaged individuals is 
preferred by employers? 
2. What are employers' attitudes on the inclusion 
of wages, relocation costs, and educational 
costs in the tax credit base? 
3. What are employers' attitudes on potential 
employer abuse of a human resource tax credit? 
4. rio employers feel it would be feasible and 
effective to establish a maximum acceptable 
employee turnover ratio as an employer eligi-
bility requirement for a human resource tax 
credit? 
5. I~ firm size or business activity a factor 
affecting the attitudes of employers on the 
desirability and nature of a human resource 
tax credit? 
Chapter V involves an analysis of employers' numerical 
estimates related to a tax credit employer eligibility 
requirement, the tax credit base, the tax credit rate, and 
the potential effect of a human resource tax credit. The 
following questions are analyzed in this chapter: 
1. What maximum employee turnover rate would be 
fair as an employer eligibility requirement 
for a human resource tax credit? 
2. If a tax credit is granted on wages paid 
disadvantaged employees, over what length 
of time should the wages paid such employees 
be included in the tax credit base? 
J. What magnitude of credit rates is necessary in 
order for a tax credit to have an effect on the 
employment, relocation, and education of 
disadvantaged individuals? 
4. What is the potential effect of alternative 
tax credit rates on the employment of 
disadvantaged individuals? 
5. What is the potential tax revenue loss of 
alternative tax credit rates? 
6. Are the employment plans of employers flexible 
enough so that they could be adjusted to take 
into account monthly changes in the tax credit 
rate? 
7. Would employers be willing to add disadvantaged 
individuals to their registered apprenticeship 
programs if granted a tax credit on wages paid 
such individuals during their apprenticeship 
training? 
A final chapter summarizes the results of the study 
7 
and presents conclusions and recommendations relating to 
the desirability and nature of a human resource tax credit. 
Significance of Study 
A most important question concerning the use of a 
human resource tax credit is whether or not employers would 
prefer this type of incentive over a direct expenditure 
subsidy. This study provides significant empirical data on 
this question. Additionally, if human resource tax credit 
legislation again comes under consideration in the Congress, 
this study ~rovides data which should be useful in answering 
the following questions: 
1. On what cost factors should a human resource 
tax credit be based? 
2. How much of a tax credit is necessary in order 
for it to stimulate the desired response in 
industry? 
3. What is the potential effect of a human resource 
tax credit on the nation's employment and on 
tax revenue? 
Finally, it is felt that this study is significant in 
that it points to the need for additional research on the 
8 
use of tax credits to combat social, economic, and environ-
mental problems. 
Limitations of the Study 
This study is limited to a survey of employers' 
attitudes and estimates on the desirability, nature, and 
potential effectiveness of a tax credit financial incentive 
to encourage increased employment and training of 
disadvantaged individuals. No attempt was made to obtain 
estimates from government officials or participating 
employers on the extra administrative costs of such a tax 
incentive. Nor was there any attempt to measure the relative 
administrative efficiency of a tax credit financial incentive 
versus a direct expenditure incentive. The study was also 
limited in that it did not seek to measure union reaction 
to the tax credit approach. Chapter II does, however, make 
note of a union argument against the tax incentive approach. 
Also, this study involves only the demand side of the labor 
market for disadvantaged individuals. No attempt was made 
to study the effectiveness of government agencies in iden-
tifying individuals eligible for tax credit employment. 
9 
To summarize, although it is felt that this study 
generated meaningful data on the nature and potential effec-
tiveness of a human resource tax credit, it should be 
viewed as only· a step in the gathering of empirical data 
necessary to properly evaluate such a tax credit. 
Clarification of Terms 
Disadvantaged Individual. For the purpose of this study 
a disadvantaged individual is anyone so designated by the 
employment security office in accordance with the U.S. 
Department of Labor definition of a disadvantaged individual. 
(See infra, p. 21.) 
Tax Credit. "A tax credit is an allowance that can be 
directly offset against the tax liability of an individual 
or business, in contrast to a tax deduction, which is 
subtracted from gross income before tax." 8 
Tax Credit Base. Cost elements such as the taxable wages 
reported on the employer's withholding statement, education 
costs, and relocation costs. The credit base is the dollar 
amount of qualifying cost elements to which the credit rate 
is applied in computation of the net tax credit. 
Qualified Education Cost-. Education costs which would be· 
defined by the Internal Revenue Service as eligible for 
inclusion in a human resource tax credit base. 
8Tax Credits Past Ex 
York: Tax Foundation, 
and Current Issues (Ne~ 
' p. 3 • 
· 10 
Relocation Costs. Costs paid by employers to move disadvan-
• 
taged.individuals from a labor surplus area to the 
employer's labor market area. Such costs ·would constitute 
part of the credit base and would be strictly defined in the 
Internal Revenue Service Code • 
. Tax Credit Rate. A percentage established by the tax law. 
This percentage is applied against the credit base in 
computing the net amount of the credit. 
CHAPTER II 
SUMMARY OF HUMAN RESOURCE TAX CREDIT LEGISLATION 
AND PROPOSALS, AND A REVIEW OF THE ISSUES 
Several tax credit plans for encouraging employers to 
increase their employment and training have been proposed 
in recent years. The Congress has also enacted into law a 
tax credit on wages paid individuals employed under a work 
incentive program. The purpose of the chapter is to 
summarize the basic features of the tax credit legislation. 
and proposals and to review the issues surrounding the use 
of human resource tax credits. 
Tax Credit Legislation 
A human resource tax credit was incorporated into law 
as part of the 1971 Revenue Act. This credit is identified 
as the Work Incentive Program Credit. 1 
Under the work incentive tax credit an employer is 
granted a 20 percent tax credit on the first 12 months' 
wages or salaries paid to welfare recipients certified by 
1commerce Clearing House, Inc., Explanation of Revenue 
Act of.1971 (Chicago: Conunerce Clearing House, Inc., 1971), 
pp. 60~62. . 
11 
12 
the Secretary of Labor as being eligible for the tax credit. 
The maximum tax credit is $25,000 plus 50 percent of the 
taxpayer's liability in excess of $25,000. For married 
taxpayers filing separate returns the credit is limited to 
$12,500 plus 25 percent of the taxpayers taxable income in 
excess of $25,000. Unused work incentive tax credits may 
be carried back to offset tax liabilities in three prior 
years and then carried forward to offset tax liabilities in 
seven subsequent years. Since the credit was enacted in 
1971, the carryback provision applies only to tax years 
which begin after 1971. 
The work incentive tax credit also contains a provision 
which provides for a recapture of the tax credit granted on 
an employee whose employme'nt is "terminated without cause" 
prior to being employed for 24 months. Under this provision 
it will not be held that an employee's employment was 
"terminated without cause'' if the termination is determined 
under the State's unemployment compensation law to be due 
to the employee's misconduct. 
Proposed Tax Credit Plans 
Human resource tax credit proposals have ranged from 
broadly based plans intended to increase employment and 
training in general to more narrowly defined plans geared 
toward increasing employment and training of certified 
disadvantaged individuals. Various proposals which have 
been advanced are summarized in the following paragraphs. 
13 
Tax Credits to Increase Overall Employment and Training 
A bill proposing a tax credit to employers as an 
incentive to create jobs was introduced in the U.S. House 
of Representatives by Congressman McClory (Republican-
2 
Illinois) on March 21, 1963. This bill proposed granting 
employers an income tax credit for employees added to the 
employer's payroll above the average number of employees on 
the payroll during the prior three years. In introducing 
this bill, Congressman Mcclory claimed that such a tax 
credit would "stimulate economic growth" and would provide 
additional job opportunities for individuals. 
In proposing other tax credit plans Congressmen have 
recognized the need to combat unemployment due to an 
inadequately trained labor force. One of the first 
proposals of this type was introduced in Congress on July 29, 
1965 by Senator Javits (Republican-New York).3 This bill, 
if enacted, would have resulted in an amendment of the 1962 
investment tax credit provision of the tax law to include 
investments in approved training programs. The bill 
provided that training programs would be eligible for 
approval by the Secretary of Labor if they developed skills 
necessary for the national defense, replaced skills made 
2 . 
U.S. Congress, House, 88th Cong., 1st sess., March 21, 
1963, Congressional Record, CIX, 4595. 
3 
U.S. Congress, Senate, 89th Cong., 1st sess., July 29j 
1965, Congressional Record, CXI, 18801. 
14 
obsolete by automation or economic change, or retrained 
workers relocated by defense shutdowns. In stressing the 
need for enactment of the bill, Senator Javits counseled 
that a tax credit on trdining costs would result in an 
upgrading of the current work force and would make available 
entry level jobs for the unemployed and unskilled worker. 
Other proposals for providing business with a tax 
credit to stimulate increased manpower training were 
introduced in Congress as different versions of the Human 
Investment Act. The first version of this Act was 
introduced by Senator Prouty (Republican-Vermont) on 
February 17, 1965. 4 This Act proposed granting employers 
a credit against their income tax liability equal to seven 
percent of qualified manpower training costs. Qualified 
training costs were defined to include the cost of books, 
instructors' salaries, training materials and equipment, 
and a reasonable amount of overhead. In order to qualify 
for the credit, the employer had to employ the trainee for 
at least one year after the training period. Also, in a 
provision similar to one contained in the 1962 investment 
tax credit, the bill proposed a maximum credit equal to 
$25,000 plus 50 percent of the taxpayer's liability in 
excess of $25,000. 
4u.s. Congress, Senate, &9th Cong., 1st sess., 
February 17, 1965, Congressional Record, CXI, 2780. 
15 
A subsequent version of the Human Investment Act was 
introduced by Congressman Curtis (Republican-Missouri) on 
September 9, 1965. 5 This version defined covered training 
expenses with more precision. It specifically excluded 
from the credit base costs associated with the training of 
managerial, administrative, professional, and scientific 
personnel. It identified as eligible for the credit wages 
paid apprenticeship employees, employees in on-the-job 
training under the Manpower Development and Training Act, 
and employees in cooperative work-study programs. Also, 
this second version of the Act reduced from twelve to six 
months the length of time a trainee would have to remain on 
the payroll in order for the employer to qualify for the 
credit. 
Congressman Michel (Republican-Illinois) introduced 
another version of the Human Investment Act on June 20, 1966. 6 
His bill proposed placing a $40,000 overall limitation on 
the amount of the credit to be granted to any one employer. 
Also, he proposed that the tax credit rate be based on a 
graduated scale so that employers would be given a credit 
equal to 40 percent of their first$25,000 of allowable 
training costs, 20 p~rcent of the next $75,000, and seven 
percent of all allowable expenses over $100,000. 
Su.s. Congress, House, 89th Cong., 1st sess., 
September 9, 1965, Congressional.Record, CXI, 23253. 
6 . 
U.S. Congress, House, 89th Cong., 2nd sess., June 
20, 1966, Congr·essional Record, CXII, 13687. 
Other versions of the Human Investment Act were 
introduced by Senator Prouty (Republican-Vermont} on 
February 2, 1967 and on Febru~ry 17, 1969. 7 With the 
16 
exception of the credit rate which was increased from seven 
to ten percent, these versions contained essentially the 
same provisions as the September 9, 1965 version of the Act. 
However, on August 15, 1969 Senator Prouty introduced 
another version which expanded the previous versions to 
include a 20 percent tax credit on training expenses 
related to the employment and training of individuals 
certified by the various state employment agencies as 11 hard-
core118 unemployed. 9 With this added provision, this version 
gave recognition to a criticism of prior versions; i.e., 
a ten percent tax credit on training does not represent 
sufficient incentive for employers to hire individuals at 
the end of the queue of unemployed workers. Other 
proposals, dis~ussed below, were directed specifically 
toward increasing employment of target individuals. 
7 U.S. Congress, Senate, 90th Cong. 1 1st sess., 
February 2, 1967, Congressional Record, CXIII, 233~ and 
U.S. Congress, Senate, 9lst Cong., 1st sess., February 17, 
1969, Congressional Record, CXV, 2423. 
8This term is used to refer to individuals who are at 
the end of the unemployment queue because they lack basic 
employability traits; e.g., an eighth grade education. 
9 
U.S. Congress, Senate, 9lst Cong., 1st sess., August 
5, 1969, Congressional Record, CXV, 22293. 
17 
Tax Credi ts for Employment and Training of Target Individuals 
The National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders 
(Kerner Commission) reported in 1968 that urban unemployment 
was a major cause of riots in the nation's cities. 
Recognizing this problem, the Advisory Panel on Private 
Enterprise in its report to the Kerner Commission proposed 
a tax credit plan providing a subsidy to employers on wages 
paid to individuals certified as "hard-cor~" unemployed.lo 
The Panel's plan called for a 75 percent income tax credit 
on wages paid certified employees the first six months, a 
50 percent credit on the second six month's wages, and a 
25 percent credit on wages paid to such employees during the 
second year of their employment. The Panel recommended that 
employment security offices or community action agencies be 
responsible· for certifying "hard-core" unemployed indivi-
duals as eligible for tax credit employment. According to 
the plan, each certified individual would be issued a "green 
card" or some other form of identification. To prevent 
employers from obtaining a competitive advantage, the plan 
provided a maximum credit of $25,000 .plus 50 percent of the 
tax liability over $25,000. The plan also _limited to a 
percentage of a firm's employees the number of certified 
employees for whom a tax credit could be claimed. The 
limitation _was on a sliding scale so that a firm with 100 
lOReport of the National Advisory Commission on Civil 
.Disorders, Otto Kerner, Chairman (New York: The New York 
Times Company, 1968), pp. 565-66. 
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or more employees could claim a credit for no more than 15 
percent of its employees, a firm with more than 10 and fewer 
than 100 employees could claim a credit for upto 25percent 
of its work force, and a firm with 10 or fewer employees 
could claim a credit for no more than 50 percent of its 
work force. In order to eliminate any hurdle mandatory 
union membership might be to the placement. of the "hard-
core," the Panel also included in its proposal a recommen-
dation that ce'rtified employees (green card holders) be 
exempt from union membership until they become permanent 
employees. 
The manpower tax credit provisions recommended by the 
Kerner Commission were incorporated into the National 
Manpower Act introduced in the Congress on March 28, 1968~ 11 
Also, on.July 10, 1968 Senator Percy (Republican-Illinois) 
introduced a Private Enterprise Incentive Act patterned 
after the tax credit plan proposed· by the Kerner Commission 12 . . 
This Act, however, would have spread the tax credit on 
wages paid certified individuals over a one-year period 
instead of two years as proposed in the Kerner Commission's 
report. Specifically, this Act proposed a tax credit 
·equal to 75 percent of wages paid certified individuals the 
11u.s. Congress, Senate, 90th Cong., 2nd sess., March 
28, 1968, Congr~ssional Record, CXIV, 8113. 
l-2u.s. Congress Senate, 90th Cong.,. 2nd sess., July 
10, 1968, Congressional Record, CXIV, 20430. 
first four months, a 50 percent credit on wages paid the 
second four months, and a 25 percent credit on wages paid 
certified individuals during the last four months of their 
first year of employment. 
Issues Involved in the Tax Credit Approach 
The issues surrounding the use of tax credits to 
encourage increased employment and training by business are 
examined below by summarizing pro and con arguments relating 
to the feasibility, effectiveness, and efficiency of using 
tax credits. 
Feasibility of a Human Resource Tax Credit 
One of the major problems inherent in the bills 
proposing a tax credit on training appears to be an adequate 
definition of eligible on-the-job training costs. For 
example, one category of eligible training costs was defined 
in the 1969 version of the proposed Human Investment Act 
as follows: 
expenses to the taxpayer for "organized job 
training," including books, testing and training 
materials, classroom equipment and instructors 
fees, incurred in training any individual in job 
skills necessary for and directly related to his 
employment by the taxpayer or his continued 
employment with the taxpayer in a position 
requiring additional job skills, and amounts 
paid by the taxpayer to an individual as 
reimbursement for such instruction.13 
13congressional Record, CXV, 3427. 
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The above definition opens up the question of whether 
or not a firm could include as part of the credit base 
indirect expenses; e.g., property taxes for that port.ion of 
a business firm's premises which may be used for training 
activities. Inclusion of such overhead items as part of 
the cost basis for a tax credit might result in a 
substantial workload of tax cases involving the judgment of 
Internal Revenue Service auditors and employers' accountants 
on the.allocation of overhead. Those who question the use 
of a traini:hg tax credit make note of this problem. They 
point out that an attempt to include in a definition of 
training cost all costs which could reasonably be identified 
with the training effort could render meaningless the 
advantage of administrative simplicity which has been 
14 
claimed for the tax credit approach. 
THe problem of defining training cost is avoided in 
those plans which would base a tax credit on wages paid 
.eligible employees. However, with these plans there is a 
problem of defining who is to be considered an eligible 
employee. A guideline for determining such eligibility is 
provid~d in the Department of Labor's definition of disad-
vantaged·individual for federal manpower programs; e.g., 
14Daniel M Holland, "An Evaluation of Tax Incentives 
for On-The.-:""Job Training of the Disadvantaged,"· The Bell 
· Journal of Economics and Management Science, II (Spring, 
1971) i p •. 317. 
JOBs.15 Disadvantaged individuals are defined as: 
Poor individuals who do not have suitable 
employment and who are either: 
1. School dropouts 
2. Under 22 years of age 
3. 45 y~ars of age or older 
4. Handicapped, or 
5. Subject to one of the following obstacles 
to employment 
a. Unskilled workers who have had two 
or more spells of .unemployment during 
the past year totaling 15 weeks or 
more, 
b. Workers whose last jobs were in 
occupations of significantly lower 
skill than their previous jobs, 
c. Workers who have family histories 
of dependence on welfare, 
d. Workers ·who have.been permanently 
laid off jobs in induutries ·which 
are declining in their region, 
e. Members of minority groupsl6 
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·A noted weakness of the above definition is the wide range 
of interpretations it covers as to what constitutes "suit-
able employment. 11 17 
15The JOBS (Job Opportunities in Business Sector) is a 
program sponsored by the National Alliance of Businessmen 
under which the government contracts with employers to reim-
burse them for extra costs associated with employing the 
"hard-core." For an expanded discussion and evaluation of 
the JOBS program, see "Training Hard-Core Jobless: The 
Record After Two Years," U.S. News and World Report,.· March. 
30, 1970, pp. 68-72. Also see, U.S •. Department of Labor, 
Manpower administration, Introducing JOBS' 1970 (Washington, 
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1970). 
16Holland, "An Evaluation of Tax Incentives for On-
The-Job Training of the Disadvantaged," p. 307. 
17 rbid. 
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It is apparent from the prc~eding paragraphs that 
defining a base for a human resource tax credit involves 
unique problems not encountered in legislating a tax credit 
. on property. Whether or not it is possible to define 
employee training costs in such·a way so that it is feasible 
to include such costs in a human resource tax credit base is 
still open to question. 
Potential Effects of a Human Resource Tax Credit 
A major arsument advanced in support of the tax credit 
approach to encourage employment and training of the disad-
vantaged is th~t more employers will participate in the 
employment and training of eligible individuals under a tax 
credit financial incentive than would be the case under a 
financial incentive requiring a government contract. It is 
argued that a tax credit involves "a minimum of red tape," 
and accordingly will encourage smaller employers to partic-
ipate in the employment of the disadvantaged individuai.18 
It is also suggested that businessmen are afraid of 
"exasperating government requirements," and that a tax 
credit has the advantage of less government review than 
19 subsidy payments under a government contract. 
The evidence on the type of financial incentive 
preferred by employers is limited and inconclusive. In 1968 
18c · 1 a 20431 ongress1ona Recor , CXIV, • 
19c · 1 d 2346 ongress1ona Recor , CXIII, • 
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the National Industrial Conference Board sought opinions on 
the type of financial incentive preferred by business. 
Results from its survey among 356 companies showed that 
respondents were about equally divided between government 
grants or subsidies and tax relief. This survey provided 
some insight into the attitudes of employers on financial 
incentives; however, the question to which respondents were 
replying was not geared directly to a human resource tax 
credit. Specifically, companies were asked to indicate 
their preference between tax relief and other financial 
incentives for encouraging their participation in solving 
. urban problems. Reported comments of the respondents 
indicate that some of them were thinking about subsidies 
other than manpower subsidies (e.g., rent) in answering 
the question. Therefore, there is some question whether 
respondents would have answered the question in the same 
manner if they had been limited specifically to a choice 
between a tax credit or direct subsidy for employing and 
training the disadvantaged individuai. 20 In another very 
limited and unscientific poll among representatives of 47 
companies attending a meeting in 1968 of the President's 
Task Force on Occupational Training in Industry respondents 
were reported to be "about equally divided" as to their 
preference between a tax credit or direct subsidy financial 
20National Industrial Conference Board, Business Amid 
Urban Crisis Private-sector Approaches to City Problems, 
Studies in Public Affairs, No. 3 (New York: National 
Industrial Conference Board, 1968), p. 65-66. 
incentive.21 Holland makes note of the limited nature of 
both of the above surveys and he implies that there is a 
need for a scientific survey of employers on the type o_f 
financial incentive they think would best stimulate their 
,' d . . t. . 22 increase participa ion in manpower programs. 
One of the limiting features of a tax credit is that 
it provides an incentive only to companies which pay income 
tax. However, proponent~ argue that this is an advantage 
of the tax credit approach for training the disadvantaged 
in. that profitable companies provide greater job security 
arid are apt to provide more.meaningful training. 23 
In advocating a tax credit as an effective device for 
encouraging investment in human resources, proponents also 
point to the experience of the investment tax credit. For 
example, Senator Prouty in introducing the February 2, 1967 
version of the Human.Investment Act noted that the seven 
percent investment tax credit "did help to produce a surge 
of new investment in equipment and the presumption is now 
in favor of expanded activity as a result of a tax credit 
. . t. ..24 incen ive. Whether or not the investment tax credit was 
a significant factor in business decisions is still a matter 
21 
Holland, "An Evaluation of Tax Incentives for On-
The-Job Training of the Disadvantaged," p. 320. 
22 Ibid, p. 318. 
23Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil 
Disorders, p. 566. 
24congressional Record, CXIII, 2345. 
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of some debate. Data on expenditures for plant and 
equipment during the period the credit was in effect do show 
a marked increase in such expenditures. Also, an analysis 
of plant and equipment exP,enditure data during the 
suspension of the credit in 1966-67 shows that the rate of 
increase in such expenditures fell during this period. Such 
data, however, do not provide direct evidence on the effect 
of the investment tax credit. Fluctuation in plant and 
equipment· expenditures could have been caused by several 
other factors; e.g., the 1965 tax rate reduction.25 
Efficien6y of a Tax Credit Financial Incentive 
The use of tax credits to solve social and economic 
problems is often supported on the grounds that the tax 
credit approach is more efficient than direct government 
expenditures. The following statement made in support of 
manpower tax credit legislation is indicative of the 
intuitive thinking behind this premise: 
Instead of taking money in taxes, paying a number 
of bureaucratic middlemen, and spending the dif-
ference on public programs, the tax-credit method 
gives a true incentive to business to accomplish 
· the same ends much more efficiently.26 . 
25 
Ray M. Sommerfeld, Hershel M. Anderson, and Horace 
R. Brock, An Introduction to. Taxation. (New York: Harcourt, 
Brace and World, Inc., 1969), pp. 284-90. 
26congressional Record, CXIII, 2346. 
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The elimination of "bureaucratic middlemen" seems to 
be a strong argument for the efficiency of tax credits. 
However, opponents of tax credits point out that the use of 
tax credits to attack social and economic problems may lead 
to inefficient use of legislative talent. It is argued that 
the congressional committees responsible for tax credit 
legislation; i.e., House Ways and Means and Senate Finance 
Committees, do not have special expertise in areas such as 
manpower training. Under a direct expenditure program man-
power.legislation would be reiferred to a congressional com-
mittee(s} having special knowledge of manpower problems. 27 
Another weakness that has been noted in connection with 
the use of tax credits is that Congress and the Bureau of 
the Budget cannot exercise direct control over the amount 
· of tax revenue loss resulting from tax incentives. This 
lack of control has led tax credit opponents to caution that 
such incentives may not be an efficient means of combating 
social and economic problems. The fear is expressed that 
since a tax credit is available to all taxpayers it restilts 
in many taxpayers receiving a benefit for actions which 
would ·be undertaken in the absence of a tax credit. 28 
27stanley s. Surrey, "Tax Incentives as a Device for 
Implementing Government Policy: A Comparison with Direct 
Government Expenditures," Harvard Law Review, · LXXXIII 
(February, 1970), p. 728. 
28Tax Credits Past Ex erience and Current Issues (New 
York: Tax Foundation, Inc., 1969, p. 29. 
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The American Federation of Labor and Congress of 
Industrial Organizations has expressed concern that a man-
power tax credit might result in employers playing "musical 
chairs" with employees. The fear is expressed that regular 
employees would be replaced with tax credit employees, and 
that tax credit employees would be replaced with a new 
group of eligible employees as soon as their wages ceased 
to be subsidized by a tax credit.29 Advocates of human 
resource tax credits argue, however, that control procedures 
can be devised to prevent the above type of abuse. For 
example, the following control procedures for a human 
resource tax credit were recommended in a minority reportof 
the President's Task Force on Occupational Training in 
Industry: 
Displacement of regular employees to make 
room for "certified'' trainees could be readily 
checked through normal unemployment insurance 
procedures. Participating establishments would 
be flagged in the local office. U.I. Lbnemploy-
ment Insuranc~ claimants from these establish-
ments would automatically trigger an investigation 
of the ·circumstances of the layoff or dismissal. 
To ascertain that the employer is fulfilling 
the terms of his agreement, occasional spot checks 
cOuld be conducted by the field staff of investi-
gato!o employed under the Fair Labor Standards 
Act. · 
29American Federation of Labor and Congress of Indus-
trial Organizations, The AFL-CIO Platform Proposals, 
presented to the Republican and Democratic National 
Conventions, 1968, p. 4. 
30u.s. Department of Labor,Manpower Administration, A 
Government Commitment to Occu ational Trainin in Industr-
Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, August, 
1968), pp. 77-90. 
28 
It should be noted in connection with the above procedures, 
however, that as more control is exercised over a tax 
credit th~ less legitimat~ becomes the claim that a tax 
credit is simple and more attractive to employers because 
it involves less bureaucratic interference.31 
Those who question the use of tax credits to 
accomplish social objectives· also express concern that such 
incentives will make more confusing an already COil).plex tax 
law. ·They point out that the administration of social 
legislation is usually the responsibility of government 
agencies such as Health, Education, and Welfare; and that 
it may be an inefficient use of administrative talent to 
place primary responsibility for administration of a social 
program with the Internal Revenue Service. 32 However, the 
Internal Revenue Service has in the past been assigned 
responsibility for the administration of programs not 
directly connected with the collection of ta.x revenue; e.g. , 
administration of the Nixon wage and price controls. 
Moreover, proponents of a manpower tax credit contend that 
the additional· cost to administer a more complex tax code 
would be less than the cost of maintaining another 
government agency to-administer a program under which 
3lsupra, p. 22. 
32 Surrey, "Tax Incentives," pp. 729-32~ 
employers receive direct cash payments for employing and 
training the disadvantaged. 33 
Sununary 
This chapter sununarized main features of human 
resource tax credit legislation and proposals. Also,.the 
29 
debate surrounding the use of such tax credits was discussed 
by examining pro and con arguments as they relate to the 
feasibility, effectiveness, and efficiency of the tax 
incentive approach. This review of the literature indicates 
that there is a lack of empirical research data to support 
or retute contentions relating to the potential success of 
a tax credit to encourage increased employment and training 
of disadvantaged individuals. It is obvious that the 
success of such a tax credit depends on the actions of 
individual employers. Therefore, this study was designed 
(as described in the following chapter) to measure 
employers' attitudes and obtain their estimates on the 
potential impact of a tax credit on investment in human 
resources·. 
33Marie Murray, "The Human Investment Act.: Pro and. 
Con," (Washington, D.C.: The Library of Congress Legis-
lative Refeience Service, March 2, 1966), p. 8. · 
CHAPTER III 
RESEARCH METHODS 
The purpose of this chapter is to describe the 
research methodology used to obtain employers' opinions on 
the u~e of income tax credits to encourage expanded 
employment and training of disadvantaged individuals by 
private industry. The chapter includes explanations of 
the population and samples from whom empirical data were 
. obtained, the methods used for data collection, the type 
of analyses to which the data collected were subjected, 
and the statistical tests used in analyzing the data. 
· Population and Samples 
The population of this study includes approximately 
2300 firms listed in the Dun and Bradstreet Reference 
· Book of Corporate Management 1970 for Companies w·ith $20 
million or more in sales and (or) 1000 or more employees. 
The population also includes approximately 1550 Oklahoma 
firms employing more than five persons and which are not 
subsidiaries or divisions of other firms. This population 
is identified in the Oklahoma Directory of Manufacturers 
30 
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and Products.! The Directory lists firms engaged in various 
economic activities; e.g., agriculture, mining,construction, 
manufacturing, transportation, communication, wholesale and 
retail trade, and various services. It appears from 
scanning the Directory that total employment for the 
majority of firms li~ted is between 5 and 100 employees. 
This population was, therefore, considered representative 
of small employers. 
A sample of 500 firms, consisting of 250 firms from 
the Dun and Bradstreet listing and 250 firms from the 
Oklahoma listing, was selected with the use of tables of 
randomly selected numbers.. The two samples were selected 
in order to determine if firm size is a factor affecting 
employers' attitudes toward a human resource tax credit. 
Concerning the size of the samples, Simon notes that 
"there is just no easy answer to the question of how large 
a sample to take. 112 According to Blalock, as the sample 
size approaches 100 a normal distribution; e.g., a bell 
shaped curve, can generally be assumed. 3 In this connection, 
it was felt that the samples of 250 Oklahoma firms and 250 
Dun and Bradstreet firms would each yield approximately 100 
1oklahoma, Industrial Development and Park Department, 
Oklahoma Director~ of Manufacturers and Products, 1970 
(Oklahoma City, 1 70). 
2Julian L .. Simon, Basic Research Methods in· Social 
Science (New York: Random House, 1969), p. 431. 
3Hubert M. Blalock, Jr., Social Statistics 
McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1960), p. 142. 
(New York: 
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responses; and that the respondents would be representative 
of the respective populatiohs. 
A consideration in determining sample size was also 
the nature of the statistical tests to which the survey 
results were to be subjected. According to Siegel, the 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test (this test is discussed in a 
subsequent section) can be used for testing the statistical 
significance of differences between very small samples; 
e.g., samples of fewer than eight firms; and it can also 
be used for testing the statistical significance of 
differences between large samples; e.g., samples containing 
100 or more firms. 4 Therefore, use of the Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test was not restricted by the sample sizes of this 
study. Also, Chao's discussion of the difference in means 
(t test) and analysis of variance (F test) indicates that 
the number of responses received from the independent 
samples of this study was sufficient for the use of these 
5 
tests. The t and F tests are discussed in a subsequent 
section. 
Data Collection 
A mail questionnaire was utilized in this study in 
order to obtain the following type of information: 
4 'd . 1 . . . · Si ney Siege, Nonparametric Statistics for the 
Behavioral Sciences· (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 
1956), p. 48. 
5 
Lincoln L. Chao, Statistics: Methods and Analyses (New 
York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1969), pp. 260 and 301. 
1. The attitudes of employers toward a tax 
credit versus contractual reimbursement 
for training the disadvantaged. 
2. Employers' attitudes on employer eligibility 
and tax credit base criteria. 
3. Employers' estimates of the appropriate 
magnitude for the tax credit eligibility 
and base criteria and for the tax credit 
rates. 
4. Employers' estimates of the effect a wage 
tax credit would have on their employment, 
including apprentice employment. 
5. Employers' opinions on the adaptability of 
their employment plans to changes in a tax 
credit rate. 
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An initial questionnaire was prepared in a format that 
attempted to incorporate the best ideas from textbooks on 
questionnaire design. 6 Competent advice was also obtained 
from statisticians at Oklahoma State University. In 
discussing questionnaire design, Oppenheim states that 
"probably the best way to assess a question is make it 
part of a short questionnaire and administer it to a pilot 
sample of about fifty people." 7 During the period April 10 
to May 8, 1971 test versions of the questionnaire used in 
this study were mailed to the presidents of 50 Dun and 
Bradstreet firms and 60 Oklahoma firms. Responses to the 
test surveys were received from 26 firms (23.6 percent}. 
No follow-up mailings were made of the test instruments. 
6Textbooks used were: A.N. Oppenheim, Questionnaire 
Design and Attitude Measurement (New York: Basic Books,Inc. 
1~66); and Herbert Hyman, survey Design and Analysis: Prin-
ciples, Cases, and Procedures (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free 
Press, 1955). 
7oppenheim, Questionnaire Design, p. 28. 
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The results of the test surveys indicated that 
employers understood the questions being asked but were 
hesitant to think in terms of more than one credit rate in 
answering questions concerning the effect of the credit on 
their employment decision. Therefore, the final instrument 
did. not ask employers to assume different credit rates in 
answering questions concerning the potential effect of the 
tax credit. 
The final version of the questionnaire was mailed to 
the presidents of 250 Dun and Bradstreet firms and 250 
Oklahoma firms on May 22, 1971. In order to improve 
response, follow-up letters and additional copies of the 
questionnaire were mailed to the nonrespondent Dun and 
Bradstreet firms on Jurie 11 and 28, and to the nonrespondent 
Oklahoma firms on June 5 and 26. The questionnaire and 
cover letters are included in the appendix of this study. 
Answers to the questionnaire were received from 
45.4 percent of the firms surveyed.· In addition, another 
3.2 percent of the firms (16 firms) responded without 
filling out the questionnaire. Company policy and lack of 
information were reasons given by-some of the firms for not 
filling out the questionnaire. Nine of the firms which 
did not fill out the questionnaire did, however, add 
comments pertinent to the survey. In all, responses were 
received from 124 (49.6 percent) of the Oklahoma firms and 
119 (4 7. 6 percent) of the Dun and Bradstreet firms. 
35 
Although the identity of respondents was not asked for 
on the questionnaire, some of the returned .questionnaires 
were signed by the president or other responsible indi-
viduals in· the firm. These signatures provide support for· 
the assumption that completed questionnaires were filled 
out by responsible, competent individuals. 
In order to obtain additional insight into why 
employers did or did not indicate a preference for the tax 
credit approach, telephone interviews were conducted with 
fifteen of the Oklahoma respondents. The telephone 
interviews were also used to obtain an indication of the 
reliability that can be placed on the responses to the 
mail instrument~ An indication of the reliability is that 
in responding to a telephone interview question regarding 
a tax credit versus direct expenditure financial incentive 
only one of the fifteen respondents indicated a preference 
different than their answer to a similar question on the 
mail questionnaire. 
Analysis of Data 
The data obtained in this study were analyzed for the 
overall Dun and Bradstreet and Oklahoma samples and for 
subsamples of these firms. The subsamples of Dun and 
Braditreet firms were determined by classifying respondents 
according to the standard industrial classification code 
into the following four categories: mariufacturing, 
36 
wholesale-retail, utility-transportation, and financial. 
Firms engaged in mining activity were included in the manu-
facturing classification. The subsamples of Oklahoma firms 
were determined by classifying the respondents according to 
principal product, as identified in the Oklahoma Directory 
of Manufacturers and Products. The firms were classified 
into the following four categories: construction, 
industrial, food, and miscellaneous. It is felt that the 
breakdown of the data from the Dun and Bradstreet and 
Oklahoma firms into the above subsamples provides some 
insight into the effect, if any, of business activity on 
the firms' responses to the statements and questions 
related to a human resource tax credit. 
The study generated both ordinal and ratio data. To 
comprehend the difference between ordinal and ratio data, 
note that with ratio data we can say that the distance 
between 1 and 2 is the same as the distance between 2 and 3. 
However, with ordinal data, we can only say that one 
category ranks higher or lower than another; e.g., strongly 
agree ranks higher than agree and agree ranks higher than 
uncertain. With ordinal data we cannot say that the 
distance between two categories; e.g., strongly agree and 
agree, is the same as the distance between another two 
categories; e.g., agree and uncertain~ Also, with ordinal 
data we cannot say that two respondents mean the same thing 
when they select identical choices. For example, the term 
strong agreement will have different degrees of meaning to 
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different individuals. With ratio data, however, when two 
people select the same choice, e.g., the number 5 in 
response to a question asking the number of persons in the 
respondent's family, there is no doubt that they mean the 
same thing. 
The ordinal data obtained in this study related to 
employers' attitudes on the desirability and nature of a 
human resource tax credit. Such data were analyzed by 
tabulating frequency and percentage distributions of the 
responses from the different types of Dun and Bradstreet and 
Oklahoma firms. The responses of each sample and subsample 
were also tested against the following operational null 
hypotheses in order to determine the significance of the 
attitudes of large and small employers and different types 
of employers: 
1. Employers do not have significant preferences 
between tax credit and contractual reimburse-
ment for employing the disadvantaged. 
2. Employers do not have significant attitudes 
with regard to the feasibility and effective-
ness of a tax credit on wages paid indi'vid-
uals certified as disadvantaged. 
3.· Employers do not have significant attitudes 
with regard to the feasibility and effective-
ness of a tax credit on the cost incurred by 
employers to relocate a disadvantaged 
individual from a labor surplus area to the 
employer's labor market area. 
4. Employers do not have significant attitudes 
with regard to the feasibility and effective-
ness of a tax credit on educational costs 
paid for disadvantaged employees. 
5. Employers do not have significant attitudes 
with regard to potential employer abuse of 
a human resource tax credit through 
replacement of regular employees with tax 
credit employees. 
6. Employers do not have significant attitudes 
with regard to the use of employee turnover 
as an employer eligibility requirement for 
a human resource tax credit. 
12. The opinions of employers on their ability 
to adapt their employment plans to changes 
in the magnitude of a human resource tax 
credit rate are not statistically significant. 
The tests of hypotheses one through six are reported in 
Chapter IV. The test of hypothesis twelve is reported in 
Chapter V. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov one-sample test was 
used to test these hypotheses. This test is discussed 
below in the section on statistical tests. 
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The rati_o data in this study consisted of employers' 
estimates related to employer eligibility and base criteria; 
the magnitude of tax credit rates on wages, relocation costs, 
and education costs; and the potential effect of a tax 
credit on the firm's employment. Ratio data related to 
employer eligibility and base criteria and tax credit rates 
were analyzed by tabulating frequency and percentage 
distributions and means for the samples and· subsamples of 
Dun and Bradstreet and Oklahoma firms. In addition, the 
responses were tested against the following operational 
null hypotheses in order to gain insight into the feasi-
bility o_f establishing uniform employer eligibility and base 
criteria and uniform credit rates for employers which 
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differ significantly with respect to firm size and business 
activity:. 
7. There are no significant differences between 
Dun and Bradstreet and Oklahoma firms and 
among subsamples of these ·firms on the 
employee turnover ratio which should be 
established as an employer eligibility 
requirement for a human resource tax credit. 
8. There are no significant differences between 
Dun and Bradstreet and Oklahoma firms and 
among subsamples of these firms on the length 
of time wages paid disadvantaged employees 
should be covered by an income tax credit. 
9. There are no significant differences between 
Dun and Bradstreet and Oklahoma firms and 
among subsamples of these firms on the rate 
that should be established for a tax credit 
on wages. 
10. There are no significant differences between 
Dun and Bradstreet and Oklahoma firms and 
among subsamples of these firms on the rate 
that should be established for a tax credit 
on costs incurred by employers to relocate 
disadvantaged individuals to the employer's 
labor market area. 
11. There are no significant differences between 
Dun and Bradstreet and Oklahoma firms and 
among subsamples of these firms on the rate 
that should be established for a tax credit 
on educational costs paid for disadvantaged 
employees. 
The tests of the above hypotheses are reported in 
Chapter V. The differences in means (t test) was used to 
test the hypotheses for differences between the Dun and 
Bradstreet and Oklahoma firms. The analysis of variance 
(F test) was used to test the hypotheses for differences 
among the four classifications of Dun and Bradstreet firms 
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and among the four classifications of Oklahoma firms. These 
tests are discussed below in the section on statistical 
tests. 
Ratio data on the potential effect of a tax credit 
were also obtained by asking employers to indicate the 
number of disadvantaged individuals they would add to their 
present employment if granted a tax credit on the wages 
paid such individuals. In responding to this question, 
employers were asked to assume the credit rate and base 
period indicated in their responses to earlier statements on 
the questionnaire. To analyze this data, the Dun and 
Bradstreet and Oklahoma firms were classified according to 
the credit rate indicated in their response to the question 
asking their estimate of the magnitude of credit rate 
necessary to affect their employment decision. The number 
of firms, present employment of the firms, employers' 
estimates of the additional employment of disadvantaged 
individuals which would result from the tax credit, and 
the percentage increase in employment were tabulated for 
seven credit rate intervals~ These statistics were then 
related to national statistics on employment in order to 
estimate the potential effect of alternative tax credit 
rates on the nation's employment and on tax revenue. 
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Explanation of Statistical Tests 
The Kolmogorov-Smirnov one-sample statistical test was 
used to test at the .05 level of significance hypotheses 
related to employers' attitudes on the desirability and 
nature of a human resource tax credit. Testing at the .05 
level of significance means that there is less than 5 
percent probability that a sample response could occur if 
the null hypothesis being tested is true. A one-sample 
statistical test (rather than a two sample statistical test; 
e.g., Mann-Whitney tl) was appropriate because the J:wpothesis. 
involved tests of the statistical s~gnificance of responses 
from individual samples and subsamples, rather than tests of 
the statistical significance of differences between samples •. 
The Kolmogorov-Smirnov one-sample test was chosen over 
the one-sample t test and over the one-sample x2 (Chi 
squar~ test because the hypotheses are related to ordinal 
data which were obtained from a Likert-type scale. In 
discussing a Likert-type scale, Selltiz, et al., state: 
the subjects are asked to respond to each item 
in terms of several degrees of agreement or 
disagreement; for example, (1) strongly approve, 
(2) approve, (3) undecided, (4) disapprove, 
(5) strongly disapprove •••• the Likert-type scale 
does not claim to be more than an ordinal scale; 
that is, it makes possible the ranking of indi-
viduals in terms of the favorableness of their 
attitude toward a given object, but it does not 
provide a basis for saying how much more favor-
able one is than another, nor for measuring the 
amount of change after some experience.a 
Bselltiz, et al., Research Methods in SocialRelations 
(New York: Holt Rinehart and Winston, 1959), pp. 366-69. 
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According to the above quotation, data obtained from a 
Likert-type scale is ordinal rather than interval. Siegel 
notes that the t test is not appropriate for data measured 
on an ordinal scale; 9 e.g., employer's attitudes. The t 
test is, however, used in connection with ratio data 
obtained in this study; e.g., employers' numerical estimates 
of credit rate magnitudes, etc. 
The x2 test could have been used for testing the 
hypotheses related to data measured on ah ordinal scale; 
however, when ordinal measurement has been obtained, Siegel 
suggests that the x2 test is not as powerful as the 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test because with the x2 test information 
is lost through the combining of categories. 1° For example, 
use of the x2 test in this study would have resulted in the 
combining of three agreement and three disagreement cate-
gories intq two categories-one for agreement and one for 
disagreement. The x2 test is useful for nominal data. 
Nominal data results when respondents are only given a 
choice of yes or no in response to a question or statement. 
Nominal data does not provide for a ranking of categories. 
The following paragraphs describe the use of the 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov, t, and F tests. Examples are included 
for the purpose of explaining the logic of the tests~ The 
examples do not preseht findings of the study. 
9siegel, Nonparametric Statistics, p. 19. 
lOibid., p. 51. 
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Under the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test a theoretical 
cumulative percentage distribution. indicated by a null 
hypothesis is compared with a cumulative percentage 
distribution of actual responses from a population sample. 
To illustrate the use of this test, assume responses from 
60 employers to the questionnaire item for.which Hypothesis 


























Under the null hypothesis, which states that employers do 
not have significant preferences between tax credit and 
contractual reimbursement, we theorize the following per-

























Siegel notes that the theoretical distribution under the 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test is based on the assumption that if 
respondents do not have strong opinions with regard to the· 
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characteristic being measured each response category "should 
be chosen equally often except for random differences. 1111 
Thus, with the ordinal data bf this study, it is assumed 
·that if employers do not have strong opinions on the 
attitude being measured, there will be a uniform distribu-
tion among the response categories. The Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test is used to determine at the .OS significance 
level whether the actual sample responses could have come 
from a population with attitudes as specified by the 
theoretical distribution. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test 
involves the computation of a test value, D. The D value is 
equal to the maximum absolute deviation which occurs between 
a response category in the cumulative distribution of actual 
responses and the corresponding response category in the 
theoretical cumulative distribution. For the above data, 
the maximum deviation is .25. This value occurs in both 
the moderate agreement and slight agreement categories. 
Therefore, the D statistic for this data is equal to .25. 
Reference to a table of D values12 shows that for samples 
(n) greater than 35 a D value is significant at the .05 
1. 36 
level if it is equal to or greater than vh • For a 
1.36 
sample of 60, the v'ii' is equal to .176. Since the D 
value of .25 for the above data is greater than .176, the 
11rbid., p. 49. 
12 Ibid., p. 251. 
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null hypothesis is rejected at the .05 level of significance; 
i.e~, there is less than five percent probability that a 
sample of 60 employers would respond in the manner shown in 
the actual distribution above if employers in the total 
population were evenly divided in their attitudes toward 
tax credit versus contractual reimbursement. Therefore, 
assuming the hypothetical data of this example, it would be 
concluded that employers do have significant preferences 
between tax credit and contractual reimbursement for 
employing the disadvantaged. 
The t test was used to test at the .05 level of 
significance Hypotheses 7 through 11 above for the signifi-
cance of differences between Dun and Bradstreet and Oklahoma 
firms. These hypotheses relate to ratio data on employe;r 
eligibility, the tax credit base, and the tax credit rate. 
The t test was chosen because it is appropriate for ratio 
data, and because it is designed to test the significance 
of differences between two samples. 13 
To illustrate the t. test, assume the following means 
and variances for the responses of 101 Dun and Bradstreet 
firms and 99 Oklahoma firms to a question related to Hypoth-
esis 10, which specifies that there is no significant dif-
ference between Dun and Bradstreet and Oklahoma firms onthe 
rate that should be establishe~ for a tax credit on wages: 
13oelbert C. Miller, Handbook of Research Design and 
Social Measurement (New York: David McKay Company, Inc., 




Size of. sample 
Mean response 
Variance 
compute t, the estimated 
(n ) 101 
(x+) 2 o 
(sf) 1200 
standard error 
difference (SD) is determined as follows: 
SD =~si 
>\ 
s" 1200 1274 
2 
""'----" 
n 2-1 100 98 n1 -1 
The t ratio is then computed as follows: 





According to Chao, the normal distribution (Z) can be u~ed 
as an approximation of the t distribution when the sample 
is large. He states that a sample of 31 or more observa-
tions can be considered large with a negligible risk of 
error. 14 Therefore, for the Dun and Bradstreet and Oklahoma 
samples it is appropriate to use the Z distribution for 
evaluating whether the computed t is significant. Under 
the Z distribution, a value is significant at the .05 
level if it is equal to or greater than 1.96 or if it is 
less than or equal to -1.96. Since the computed t above is 
less than 1.96 but greater than -1.96, the null hypothesis 
is not rejected at the .05 level. Therefore, assuming the 
14chao, Statistics: Methods and Analyses, p. 253-260. 
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hypothetical data in this example, it could not be concluded 
with at least a 95 percent probability that there is a 
significant difference between Dun and Bradstreet and 
Oklahoma firms on the rate that ·should be established for 
a tax credit on wages. 
The F test was used to test at the .05 level of 
significance Hypotheses 7 through 11 above for significant 
differences among different types of Dun and Bradstreet and 
Oklahoma firms. The F test was chosen because it is 
appropriate for ratio data and because the F test is 
designed to test the significance of differences among the 
15 
means of more 1 than two samples. 
The F ratio for determining the significance of 





















Ki~ equal to the number of different samples. 
Xik ifi equal to the square of the ith score in 
t2e kt sample. 
T is equal to the square of the total of all the 
ra~ scores. 
Tk is equal to the sguare of the total of the 
raw scores for the ktfi sample. 
N is equal to the total number of raw scores. 
nkhis equal to the number of raw scores in the 
kt sample. 
15rbid., p. 495. 
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To illustrate the F test, assume the following values are 
computed from data provided by three different types of 
Dun and Bradstreet firms in response to the question related 
to Hypothesis 10, which specifies that there is no signif-
icant difference among subsamples of Dun and Bradstreet 
firms with respect to the rate that should be established 

























By substituting the above values into the F ratio formula 
and solving we obtain the following: 
44,030 - 43,740 
2 145 
F = = = 4.6 
31.5 
44,408 - 44,030 
12 
Reference to a table of F ratios16 shows that for the 
above samples an F ratio greater than or equal to 3.89 is 
significant at the .05 level. Since 4.6 is greater than 
3.89, Hypothesis 10 would be rejected for the above 
16 . 
Ibid, , p. 4 9 5. 
49 
hypothetical data. Therefore, we would conclude that there 
is at laast a 95 percent probability that the different 
types of Duri and Bradstreet firms represented by the above 
samples do have significantly different opinions with regard 
to the necessary magnituqe of a tax credit on wages. 
Summary 
This chapter has detailed the research methods used 
in this study to obtain and analyze employer data on the 
nature and potential effect of a human resource tax credit. 
This discussion included a description of the population 
and samples, the data col_lection procedures, the type of 
analyses performed on the data, and the statistical tests 
used.in the analyses. The findings, conclusions, and 
recommendations resulting from this research are presented 
in the following chapters. 
CHAPTER IV 
FINDINGS AND IMPLICATIONS OF EMPLOYERS' ATTITUDES ON THE 
DESIRABILITY AND NATURE OF A TAX CREDIT TO ENCOURAGE 
EMPLOYMENT AND TRAINING OF DISADVANTAGED 
INDIVIDUALS 
The purpose of this chapter is to report and analyze 
employer's attitudes related to the desirability and nature 
of a human resource tax credit. First, employers' prefer-
ences between a tax credit and contractual reimbursement 
for employing and training the disadvantaged are summarized 
and analyzed. Second, the chapter examines the attitudes 
of employers on the feasibility and effect of including in 
the base of a tax credit wages paid disadvantaged individ-
uals, education costs paid by employers for such individuals, 
and the costs associated with relocating a disadvantaged 
person from a labor surplus area to the employer's labor 
market area. Finally, this chapter presents· a summary and 
analysis of employers' attitudes on the potential abuse of 
a human resource tax credit by employers and on the control 
of this potential abuse through a requirement specifying 
that a firm's employee turnover ratio be below a specified 
maximum in order for the firm to be eligible for the tax 
credit. 
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Tax Credit Versus Contractual Reimbursement 
for Employing _the Disadvantaged 
Hypothesis 1: Employers do not have significant 
preferences between tax credit and contractual 
reimbursement for employing the disadvantaged. 
It was noted in Chapter II that a major issue 
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concerning the use of a tax credit to encourage employment 
of the disadvantaged is the receptiveness of private 
business firms to this type of approach. The issue is 
in essence a question of the mode of reimbursement 
preferred by employers. In order to obtain information 
on this issue, the employers surveyed in this study were 
asked to indicate their degree of preference between a 
tax credit or direct contract form of reimbursement. 
Specifically, employers were asked to express their 
degree of agreement or disagreement with the following 
statement: 
Your firm would be more inclined to employ 
certified individuals if granted a tax 
credit providing a reimbursement of a 
percentage of their wages than if required 
to enter into a formal contract with the 
government in order to receive a reimburse-
ment of an equivalent amount. 
The heading of the research instrument informed repondents 
that "certified individuals" referred t_o persons identified 
as disadvantaged by local employment security offices. The 
frequency and percentage distributions of the 225responses 
to the above statement are presented in Table I. 
TABIB I 
FREQUENCY AND PERCENTAGE DIST·RIBUTION OF EMPLOYERS I RESPONSES 
TO STATEMENT SPECIFYING A PREFERENCE FOR TAX CREDIT 
REIMBURSEMENT OVER CONTRACTUAL REIMBURSEMENT 
Dun and Bradstreet Firms 
Manu- Wholesale- Utility-
facturiE_& Retail Transeortation Financial 
Type of Response Na (%)b N (%) N (%) N (%) 
Strong Agreement 24 (36) 4 (40) 5 (25) 2 (15) 
Moderate Agreement 15 (22) 2 (20) 5 (25) 3 (21) 
Slight Agreement 12 1ill .J!. .L.Ql .2 .D1l __§_ iill 
Total Agreement 54 (80) .6 (60) 13 (65) 11 (79) 
Slight Dis.agreement 3 ( 5) 1 (10) 4 (20) 0 ( 0) 
Moderate Disagreement 4 ( 6) 1 (10) 0 ( 0) 0 ( 0) 
Strong Disagreement __§_ ..l.22. ...1 .QQl .2 .D1l .2 .illl 
Total Disagreement 13 (20) 4 (40) 7 (35) 3 (21) 
Total Res,ponses 67 (100) 10 (100) 20 (100) 14 (100) 
. D Values .306* .267 .184 .286 
Oklahoma Firms 
Con- Indus- Mis eel-
struction trial . Food laneous 
Type of Response N (%) N (7.) N (7.) N (%) 
Strong Agreement 5 (46) 14 (37) 7 (30) 16 (38) 
Moderate Agreement 4 (36) 12 (32) 8 (35) 5 (12) 
Slight Agreement .J!. .L.Ql ...2 1.112. .2 i..lli. 15 Q§.2. 
Total Agreement 9 (82) 31 (82) 18 (78) 36 (86) 
Slight Disagreement 1 ( 9) 2 ( 5) 2 ( 9) 3 ( 7) 
Moderate Disagreement 0 ( 0) 2 ( 5) 1 ( 4) 1 ( 2) 
Strong Disagreement _l ..l.22. .2 .Lll ...1 .i.2.2. -1. .Lll 
.Total Disagreement 2 (18) 7 (18) 5 (22) 6 (14) 
Total Responses 11 (100) 38 (100) 23 (100) 42 (100) 







8 ( 7) 











8 ( 7) 





*D value is significant at the .05 level. (See Siegel, Non~arametric Statistics, 
Table E, p. 251.) 
aNumber of Responses 
hPercent of Total Responses 
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Summary of Results 
The data in Table I show that a majority of the 
Dun and Bradstreet firms (75 percent} and a majority of 
the Oklahoma firms (82 percent} agree that they would be 
more inclined to employ certified disadvantaged individuals 
under a tax credit approach than under a formal contractual 
agreement with the government. Moreover, the percentage 
distributions for the four subsamples of Dun and Bradstreet 
firms and for the four subsamples of Oklahoma firms show 
that a majority of the firms in each subsample prefer a 
tax credit approach. In order to determine the significance 
of these response distributions, the responses of each of 
the samples and subsamples were subjected to the Kolmogorov-
Smirnov one-sample test. Table I shows that the D values 
computed under this test are significant at the .05 level 
for the overall Dun and Bradstreet sample, the overall 
Oklahoma sample, the manufacturing subsample of Dun and 
Bradstreet firms, and for all four subsamples of 
Oklahoma firms. The significant D values mean that 
Hypothesis 1 is rejected for these classifications of 
firms. It is concluded, therefore, that there is at 
least a 95 percent probability that the populations 
represented by these firms have significant preferences 
with regard to a tax credit versus contractual reim-
bursement for employing the disadvantaged. 
Although the D values for the wholesale-retail 
firms, utility-transportation firms, and financial firms 
in the Dun and Bradstreet sample are not significant; 
60 percent of the wholesale-retail firms, 65 percent of 
the utility-transportation firms, and 79 percent of the 
financial firms do indicate some degree of preference for 
the tax credit approach. With small samples a very large 
D value is required for statistical significance; e.g., 
the D value for the ten wholesale-retail firms would have 
to be equal to or greater than .410 in order for it to 
be significant at the .05 level. There is reason to 
believe, therefore, that responses of these firms would 
.have been statistically significant if the samples 
were larger. Overall, the data.in Table I indicate that 
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a majority of all types of firms in the Dun and Bradstreet 
and Oklahoma populations favor tax credit over contractual 
reimbursement for employing and training the disadvantaged. 
Most of the reasons given by respondents for 
preferring the tax credit approach were centered around 
the apparent administrative simplicity of this approach. 
Below are some of the comments made by respondents to 
the mail questionnaire and to follow-up telephone 
interviews: 
Based on prior experience in contracting 
with the government a tax credit would be 
less cumbersome. 
Tax credit involves less forms than a 
government contract 
Experience with the investment tax credit 
favorable. 
Less paper work and government interference 
with a tax credit. 
Pref~r tax credit because of less red tape. 
Have hired hard core before but it didn't 
work out. Didn't fool around with 
reimbursement. 
What is wrong with the JOBS training 
program - 'red tape' makes it impossible 
for small employers to consider it. 
Some comments of employers who questioned the tax credit 
approach were: 
It seems to have built in inequities and 
would be extremely difficult to administer. 
You have to wait too long for /an7 income 
tax credit and then /it7 is good-only if 
there is profit. - -
Tax credits are expensive and difficult 
to administer. 
A tax credit generally always results 
in some abuse. 
Implications of Results 
In the report of the Kerner Commission it was 
stated in reference to the participation of .employers 
in the employment and training of the disadvantaged that: 
Effective administration of a monetary 
incentive is almost as important in 
attracting widespread business interesr 
as the amount of the incentive itself. 
1Re ort of the National Advisor Commission on 
Civil Disorders, Otto Kerner, Chairman New York: The 
New York Times Company, 1968), p. 564. 
SS 
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The data in Table I and the foregoing comments of respon-
dents provide support for the above statement. Both the 
comments of respondents in favor of the tax credit reim-
bursement and the comments of respondents in favor of 
contractual reimbursement indicate complexity of adminis-
tration is a factor affecting their choice. Some of t~e 
respondents also cite prior experience in contracting with 
the government as a reason for being against this approach. 
Such comments are in conflict with the viewpoint noted by 
Holland that perhaps getting employers to participate in 
government contracts is essentially a matter of the employer 
"getting his feet wet." Under this theory once employers 
have contracted with the government they will lose their 
fear of this method of reimbursement. 2 Of course, even if 
this viewpoint is true, there still exists the problem of 
persuading the large majority of employers who have never 
had a government contract to enter into their first such 
contract. 
The major implication for government policy in the 
above results is that a tax credit incentive will attract 
more employers, regardless of their size or'the nature of 
their business, to on-the-job training programs for the 
disadvantaged than direct contractual r'eimbursement. 
2oaniel M. Holland, "An Evaluation of Tax Incentives 
for On-the-Job Training of the Disadvantaged," The Bell 
Journal of Economics and Management Science, II (Spring, 
1971), p. 319. 
Therefore, if "widespread" business involvement in a 
manpower program for the disadvantaged is a desirable 
objective, these results would seem to justify the recent 
action of the Congress in including in the 1971 Revenue 
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Act a provision granting a 20 percent tax credit to employers 
on wages paid to individuals certified by the Secretary of 
Labor as eligible for tax credit employment.3 Moreover, 
since the attitudes of all types of firms were so pro-
nounced in favor of tax credit reimbursement, further 
study by government planners and other researchers into 
uses of tax credits to combat other social and economic 
problems appears to be justified; e.g., research on the 
use of tax credits to encourage business development and 
installation of pollution control devices. 
Employers' Attitudes on the Feasibility and Effect 
of a Human Resource Tax Credit Based on 
Wages Paid Disadvantaged Individuals 
Hypothesis 2: Employers do not have significant 
attitudes with regard to the feasibility and 
effectiveness of a tax credit on wages paid 
individuals certified as di-sadvantaged. 
In advocating an income tax credit as a means of 
encouraging increased employment and training of the 
3see, Conunerce Clearing House, Inc., Explanation of 
Revenue Act of 1971 (Chicago: Conunerce Clearing House, 
Inc., 1971), pp. 60-62. 
58 
disadvantaged, the Advisory Panel on Private Enterprise 
in its report to the Kerner Commission recommended that 
such a tax credit be based on wages paid by employers to 
certified disadvantaged individuals. 4 As was noted in 
Chapter II, basing a tax credit on wages rather than 
training costs simplifies the problem of defining eligible 
training costs. In recommending a tax credit based on 
wages, the Advisory Panel reasoned that more employers 
would participate in the employment and training of the 
disadvantaged under an incentive plan "which is as simple 
and automatic as possible. 115 · To find out whether there is 
support on the part of employers for this type of tax 
credit, the employers surveyed in this study were asked to 
respond to the following statement: 
An income tax credit on the wages paid certified 
new employees could be a fea~ible and effective 
device for encouraging increased employment of 
such individuals. 
Responses to the above statement were received from 226 
firms. The frequency and percentage distributions of the 
responses are reported in Table II. 
Summary of Results 
The data in Table II show that 77 percent of the 
Dun and Bradstreet firms and 77 percent of the Oklahoma 
4Report of National Advisory Commission on Civil 
Disorders, p. 565. 
5Ibid., p. 564. 
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TABIB II 
f'REQUENCY AND PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF EMl'T..OYERS' RESPONSES TO STATEMENT 
SPr:ClFYING THAT AN INCOME TAX CREDIT ON WAGES PAID CERTIFIED EMPT..OYEES 
COULD r:NCOURAGE INCREASr:D EMPUlnDcNT OF SUCH INlllVIDUALS 
Dun and Bradstreet Firms 
Manu- Wholesale- Utility-
facturing Retail TransE:o.rtation Financial Total 
Type of Response Na ('Y.)b N ('Y.) N (%) N (%) N (%) 
Strong Agreement 16 (24) 1 (10) 0 ( 0) 2 (15) 19 (17) 
Moderate Agreement 25 (37) 4 (40) 9 (45) 3 (21) 41 (37) 
Slight Agreement 14 ..illl .....?. QQl _.!! QQl ....E. ~ 26 .Q1l 
Total Agreement 55 (82) 7 (70) 13 (65) 11 (79) 86 (77) 
Slight Disagreement 4 ( 6) 0 ( 0) 2 (10) 0 ( 0) 6 ( 5) 
Moderate Disagreement 2 ( 3) 1 (10) 1 ( 5) 0 ( 0) 4 ( 4) 
Strong Disagreement ....E. 1..22. .....?. QQl _.!! QQl -1 ..illl 15 .lli2. 
Total Disagreement 12 (18) 3 (30) 7 (35) 3 (21) 25 (23) 
Total Responses 67 (100) 10 (100) 20 (100) 14 (100) 111 (100) 
D Values .321* · .200 .150 .287 .275* 
Oklahoma Firms 
Con- Indus- Miscel-
struction trial Food laneous Total 
Type of Response N (%) N (%) N (%) N (%) N (%) 
Strong Agreement 6 (55) 12 (31) 5 (22) 15 (35) 38 (33) 
Moderate Agreement 2 (18) 11 (29) 9 (39) 6 ,./,A47,.. 28 (25) 
Slight Agreement _Q LQl ....E. ili2. -1 .ill2. Q QQ2. 22 ..Ll2l 
Total Agreement 8 (73) 29 (76) 17 (74). 34 (79) 88 (77) 
Slight Disagreement 2 (18) 1 ( 3) 2 ( 9) 3 ( 7) 8 ( 7) 
Moderate Disagreement 1 ( 9) 2 ( 5) 1 ( 4) 1 ( 2) 5 ( 4) 
Strong Disagreement _Q LQl 6 ili2. -1 .ill2. .2 .illl 14 .ill2. 
Total Disagreement 3 (27) 9 (24) 6 (26) 9 (21) 27 (23) 
Total Responses 11 (100) 38 (100) 23 (100) 43 (100) 115 ( 100) 
D Values .394* .272* .275 .291* .265* 
*D value is significant at the .05 level. (See Siegel, Non2arametric Statistics, 
Table E, p. 251.) 
aNumber of Responses 
hPercent of. Total Responses 
' 
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firms agree with the statement that an income tax credit 
on wages could be a feasible and effective device for en-
couraging increased employment of disadvantaged individuals. 
Also, percentage distributions of responses for the four 
subsamples of Dun and Bradstreet firms and for the four 
subsamples of Oklahoma firms show that a majority of firms 
in each subsample agree with the statement. The D values 
presented in Table I! show that the responses of both 
the Dun and Bradstreet and Oklahom~ firms are significant 
at the .05 level. The D values are also significant for 
the manufacturing firms in the Dun and Bradstreet sample 
and for the construction, industrial, and miscellaneous 
firms in the Oklahoma sample. The significant D values 
mean rejection of Hypothesis 2 for these firms. Therefore, 
it is concluded with at least a 95 percent probability 
that the populations from which these samples and subsamples 
were draw~ do have significant attitudes with respect to 
the feasibility and potential effect of a tax credit based 
on.wages. 
The D values in Table II are not significant for the 
wholesale-retail firms, utility-transportation firms, 
and financial firms in the Dun and Bradstreet sample and 
for the food firms in the Oklahoma sample. However, 70 
percent of the wholesale-retail firms, 65 percent of the 
utility-transportation firms, 79 percent of the financial 
firms, and. 74 percent of the food firms do indicate some 
degree of agreement with the statement. 
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As was noted ih the preceding section, a large D 
value is required for statistical significance when sample 
sizes are small. Since the samples of the above firms 
are relatively small, there is reason to believe that 
responses from larger samples of these firms would have 
yielded significant D values allowing rejection of 
Hypothesis 2. 
Implications of Results 
The above results indicate that employers of different 
sizes and types can be induced to employ disadvantaged 
individuals if given a tax credit on wages paid_ such 
individuals. On the basis of these results there is 
reason to believe that the recently enacted tax credit 
based on wages paid individuals employed under the Work 
Incentive Program will have some effect on the employment 
opportunities of such persons. 
Employers indicated that they regard a tax credit 
based on wages as a straightforward financial incentive 
for hiring the disadvantaged. One employer commented, "a 
credit based on wages makes sense, it is simply another 
adjustment on the tax return based on a figure readily 
available." Once again, these results indicate that 
simple procedures are of utmost importance to the success 
of any government program which seeks to elicit the 
cooperation of a large number of private business firms. 
Employers' Attitudes on Including the Cost of 
Relocating bisadvantaged Individuals in the 
Base of a Human Resource Tax Credit 
Hypothesis 3: Employers do not have significant 
attitudes with regard to the feasibility and 
effectiveness of a tax credit on the cost 
incurred by employers to relocate a disadvantaged 
individual from a labor surplus area to the 
employer's labor market area. 
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One of the problems involved in the placement of dis-
advantaged individuals in on-the-job training programs is 
that many of these individuals reside in areas of the 
country which have comparatively high unemployment rates. 
In this connection, Thurow notes that "imperfect labor 
mobility" is a major cause of poverty in the United States. 
He suggests that a way to overcome poverty re~ulting from 
unemployment in poverty areas is to provide incentives for 
firms to move into such areas.6 This study examines an 
incentive for relocation of the disadvantaged individual, 
rather than the business firm. The incentive proposed 
is that a human resource tax credit base include the costs 
incurred by employers to relocate a disadvantaged individual 
from a labor surplus area to the employer's labor market 
area. Although individuals with skills which are in short 
supply may find employers quite willing 'to pay their reloca-
tion expenses,, this is obviously not true in the case of 
6Lester c. Thurow, Poverty and Discrimination 
(Washington, D. C.: The Brookings Institution, 1969), 
pp. 157-158. 
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disadvantaged individuals. In order to gain insight into 
employer's attitudes on inclusion of relocation costs in a 
tax credit base, the employers surveyed in this study were 
asked to respond to the following statement: 
A tax credit on the cost incurred by employers 
to relocate certified employees from a labor 
surplus area to the employer's labor market 
area could be a feasible and effective device 
for encouraging employers to pay such expenses. 
The frequency and percentage distributions of the 222 
responses to the above statement are presented in Table III. 
Summary of Results 
The data in Table III show that 55 percent of the Dun 
and Bradstreet firms and 68 percent of the Oklahoma firms 
agree that a tax credit on relocation costs could be a 
feasible and effective device for encouraging employers 
to pay such costs for disadvantaged individuals. The D 
value computed for the responses of the Dun and Bradstreet 
firms is not significant at the .OS level. This means 
Hypothesis 3 is accepted for these firms. Therefore, it 
cannot be concluded with 95 percent probability that the 
population of Dun and Bradstreet firms has significant 
attitudes with regard to the feasibility and effect of 
granting a tax credit on relocation costs. The D value 
computed for the responses of the Oklahoma firms is, 
however, significant at the .OS level. This means 
Hypothesis 3 is rejected for these firms. Therefore, 
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TABLE III 
FREQUENCY AND PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF EMPLOYERS' RESPONSES TO STATEMENT 
SPECIFYING THAT A TAX CREDIT ON THE COST INCURRED BY EMPLOYERS TO RELOCATE 
DISADVANTAGED PERSONS COULD ENCOURAGE EMPLOYERS TO PAY SUCH EXPENSES 
Dun and Bradstreet Firms 
Manu- Wholesale-. Utility-
facturing Retail Trans:eortation Financial Total 
Type of Response Na (%)b N (%) N (%) N (%) N (%) 
Strong Agreement 9 (14) 0 ( 0) 0 ( 0) 1 ( 7 ) 10 ( 9) 
Moderate Agreement 9 (14) 2 (20) 4. (20) 3 (21.5) 18 (17) 
Slight Agreement 20 .illl --1 .QQl ~ QQl --1 .ill.ill 32 ..(ill_ 
Total Agreement 38 (59) 5 (50) 10 (50) 7 (50) 60 (55) 
Slight Disagreement 7 (10) 0 ( 0) 4 (20) 1 ( 7) 12 (11) 
Moderate Disagreement 9 (14) 1 (10) 1 ( 5) 1 ( 7) 12 (11) 
Strong Disagreement .!.!. i.!1.2. ~ 1!tQl -2. .ill2. -2. Qfil_ 25 ..Q1l 
Total Disagreement 27 (41) 5 (50) 10· (50) 7 (50) 49 (45) 
Total Responses 65 (100) 10 (100) 20 (100) 14 (100) 109 (100) 
D Values ,085 .166 .166 .191 .063 
Oklahoma Firms 
Con- Indus- Miscel-
struction trial Food laneou·s Total-
Type of Response N (%) N (%) N (%) N (%) N (%) 
Strong Agreement 3 (27) 8 (21) 6 (26) 8 (20) 25 (22) 
Moderate Agreement 2 (19) 8 (21) 5 . (22) ·5 (20) 23 (20) 
Slight Agreement --1 QZ2_ 10 Qtl ~ i.!1.2. g ..(ill_ 12. Qtl 
Total Agreement 8 (73) 26 (68) 15 (65) 28 (69) 77 (68) 
Slight Disagreement 1 ( 9) 4 (10) 2 ( 9) 3 ( 7) 10 ( 9) 
Moderate Disagreement 1 ( 9) 1 ( 3) 0 ( 0) 4 (10) 6 ( 5) 
Strong Disagreement __! .Lil ...2 .i12l ~ Qtl ~ J..ill. 20 .ill!l 
Total Disagreement 3 (27) 12 (32) 8 (35) 13 (31) 36 (32) 
Total Responses 11 (100) 38 (100) 23 (100) 41 (100) 113 (100) 
D Values .227 .184 .152 .183 .181* 
*D value is significant at the .05 ievel. (See Siegel, No-nearametric Statistics, 
Table E, p. 251. 
&Number of Responses 
bPercent of Total Responses 
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it is concluded with at least 95 percent probability that 
the population of Oklahoma firms has significant attitudes 
with regard t0 the state~ent on relocation costs. Perhaps 
a reason for the difference in response from the two samples 
is that many of the Oklahoma firms which responded to the 
survey are located in small communities where the number of 
disadvantaged individuals may be limited whereas most of the 
Dun and Bradstreet firms which responded to the survey are 
located in large urban areas where the supply of disad-
vantaged individuals is probably more than adequate. 
Therefore, in responding to the statement, Oklahoma firms 
may have foreseen a need to recruit disadvantaged persons 
from other labor market areas whereas for many of the Dun 
and Bradstreet firms such a need probably appeared 
unrealistic. 
The D values in Table III are not significant for any 
of the subsample classifications. Hypothesis 3 specifying 
that employers do not have significant attitudes with regard 
to inclusion of relocation costs in a tax credit base is 
therefore accepted for all of the subsamples. However, a 
majority of firms in each of the Oklahoma subsamples, 
ranging from 73 percent for the construction firms to 65 
percent for the food firms, agree with the statement on 
relocation cost. These percentage~ indicate ~hat signif-
icant response distributions might result from larger 
samples of these firms. In the case of the Dun and 
Bradstreet firms, the percentage of firms in each subsample 
66 
indicating agreement with the statement ranges from 59 
percent for the manufacturing subsample to 50 percent for 
each of the other three subsamples. On the basis of these 
percentages there is little reason to believe that larger 
samples of the different types of Dun and Bradstreet firms 
would have yielded responses showing significant attitudes 
toward a tax credit on relocation costs. This narrowness 
of the range in the percentage of firms agreeing with the 
tax credit among the four subsamples of Oklahoma firms and 
among the four subsamples of Dun and Bradstreet firms also 
indicates that the nature of a firm's business has little, 
if any, effect on its attitude toward a tax credit on 
relocation costs. 
Implications of Results 
The above results indicate that a tax credit on 
relocation costs might be an inducement for small employers 
in relatively rural areas to participate in the employment 
of the disadvantaged • .Moreover, the fact that 68 percent 
of the Oklahoma firms and 55 percent of the Dun and 
Bradstreet firms thought a tax credit could encourage 
employers to pay such costs should be of some inducement 
for Congress and others to study the possibility of using 
a tax credit for increasing mobility of the overall labor 
force. Precedent for using the tax law to increase mobility 
of the labor force already exists in the form of the moving 
expense deduction allowed to employees under Section 217 of· 
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the Internal Revenue Code. This provision of the ccrle allc:Ms 
individuals, subject to several rules and limitations, to 
deduct job related moving expenses; e.g., transportation costs, 
costs of temporary living expenses in new locations, etc. 
Employers' Attitudes on Including in a Human Resource 
Tax Credit Base Educational Costs Paid for 
Disadvantaged Employees 
Hypothesis 4: Employers do not have significant 
attitudes with regard to the feasibility and 
effectiveness of a tax credit on educational 
costs paid for disadvantaged employees. 
The need to complement on-the-job training with 
institutional training for the disadvantaged has been 
generally recognizea.7 To gain insight into whether 
employers could be encouraged by a tax credit to pay the 
cost of institutional training for their disadvantaged 
employees, the employers surveyed in this study were asked 
to respond to the following statement: 
An income tax credit on tuition paid colleges 
and trade schools, books, and other educational 
expenses could be a feasible and effective 
device for encouraging employers to pay such 
costs for certified individuals. 
Responses to the above statement were received from 
223 firms. The frequency and percentage distributions of 
the responses are presented in Table IV. 
7Gerald G. Sommers, "Our Experience with Retraining 
and Relocation," in Toward a Manpower Policy, ed. by 




FREQUENCY AND PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF EMPWYERS I RESPONSES TO STATEMENT 
SPECIFYING THAT AN INCOME TAX CREDIT ON EDUCATIONAL EXPENSES PAID FOR 
CERTIFIED EMPWYEES COULD ENCOURAGE EMPWYERS TO PAY SUCH EXPJ;:NSES 
Dun and Bradstreet Firms 
Manu- Wholesale- Utility-
facturing Retail Transeortation Financial Total 
Type of Response Na (%)b N (%) N (%) N (%) N (%) 
Strong Agreement 13 (20) 0 ( 0) 3 (15) l ( 7) 17 (15) 
Moderate Agreement 14 (21) 6 (60) 6 (30) 2 (14) 28 (25) 
Slight Agreement 26 .ml ....!. .llil ~ fill .2 .QQ2. 43 .ml 
Total Agreement 53 (80) 7 (70) 18 (90) 10 (71) 88 (79) 
Slight Disagreement 9 (14) 0 ( 0) 0 ( 0) l ( 7) 10 ( 9) 
Moderate Disagreement 2 ( 3) 1 (10) .1 ( 5) 0 ( 0) 4 ( 4) 
Strong Disagreement 2 .Ll2. 2 1ill. ....!. ..L.ll -2 ..{ill_ _.§. ..u2. 
Total Disagreement 13 (20) 3 (30) 2 (10) 4 (29) 22 (21) 
Total Responses 66 (100) 10 (100) 20 (100) 14 (100) 110 (100) 
D Values .303* .267 .400* .214 .300* 
Oklahoma Firms 
Con- Indus- Miscel-
st ruction trial Food laileous Total 
Type of Response N (%) N (%) N (%) N (%) N (%) 
Strong Agreement 3 (27) 9 (24) 2 ( 9) 8 (20) 22 (19) 
Moderate Agreement 2 (18.5) 9 (24) 7 (30) 10 (24) 28 (25) 
Slight Agreement -2 ..QZ.L _.§. ..illl -2 ..{ill_ ~ ..{ill_ ll ..{ill_ 
Total Agreement 8 (72. 5) 26 (69) 14 (61) 27 (66) 75 (66) 
Slight Disagreement 1 ( 9) 4 (10) 3 (13) 8 (20) 16 (14) 
Moderate Disagreement 2 (18.5) 2 ( 5) 3 (13) 4 ( 9) 11 (10) 
Strong Disagreement _Q ..LQl_ ~ 1ill. -2 illi 2 ..L.ll 11 .llil 
Total Disagreement 3 (27.5) 12 (31) 9 (39) 14 (34) 38 (34) 
Total Responses 11 (100) 38 (100) 23 (100) 41 (100) 113 (100) 
D Values .227 .184 .109 .187 .164* 
*D value is significant at the .05 level. (See Siegel, None;ararnetric Statistics, 
Table E, p. 251.) 
aNumber of Responses 
hPercent of Total Responses 
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Summary of Results 
The data in Table IV show that a majority of the Dun 
and Bradstreet firms (79 percent) and a majority of the 
Oklahoma firms (66 percent) agree that a tax credit on 
education costs could be a feasible and effective device 
for encouraging employers to pay such costs for disad-
vantaged individuals. The significant D values in the 
table indicate that there is less than five percent proba-
bility that the response distributions obtained from the 
Dun and Bradstreet and Oklahoma samples could have resulted 
from populations with indifferent attitudes toward the 
feasibility and effect of a tax credit on education costs. 
Hypothesis 4 is rejected for both the Dun and Bradstreet 
and Oklahoma firms. Based on these results it seems 
reasonable to conclude that a majority of both large and 
small firms have positive attitudes toward a tax credit on 
education costs. 
Although the D values in. Table IV show that Hypothesis 
4 is rejected for only the manufacturing and utility-
transportation subsamples of the Dun and Bradstreet firms, 
a majority of the firms in each subsample are in agreement 
with the statement on education costs. The percentage of 
agreement among the Dun and Bradstreet subsamples ranges 
from 70 percent for the wholesale-retail firms to 90 percent 
for the utility-transportation firms. The percentage of 
agreement among the Oklahoma subsamples ranges from 61 
70 
percent for the food firms to 72.5 percent for the con-
struction firms. These results indicate that a majority 
of employers, regardless of the nature of their business, 
are in favor of including in the base of a human resource 
tax credit tuition and other educational costs paid for 
disadvantaged employees. 
Implications of Results 
The above results indicate that employers could be 
induced to pay for the cost of formal schooling for the 
disadvantaged individuals on their payroll if granted a 
tax credit reimbursement for at least a portion of this 
cost. This finding can be significant in that, even 
though there are direct grants and scholarships available 
for disadvantaged individuals, there may be some advantage 
to having employers pay for the additional formal training 
they think will be of benefit to the disadvantaged employee. 
The disadvantaged employee may, for example, be more 
inclined to take his formal training seriously if he knows 
his employer is sufficiently interested in his training to 
pay the cost. In this connection, Bushnell has noted the 
importance of a job to the employee's motivation for train-
ing.8 The fact that a significant majority of both the 
8oavid s. Bushnell, "The Value of Vocational Edu-
cation," in Toward a Manpower Policy, ed. by Robert A. 
Gordon (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1967), p. 202. 
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large and small employers thought a tax credit could be an 
effective device for encouraging employers to pay education 
costs is also significant in that it provides some indi-
cation employers were not thinking of inexpensive labor for 
"dead end" jobs when they agreed to the earlier statement 
specifying that a tax credit on wages could encourage 
increased employment of disadvantaged individuals. 
Employers' Attitudes on Whether Employers Would Abuse 
a Human Resource Tax Credit by Replacing Regular 
Employees with Tax Credit Employees 
Hypothesis 5: Employers do not have significant 
attitudes with regard to potential employer abuse 
of a human resource tax credit through replacement 
of regular employees with tax credit employees. 
The fear has been expressed that a tax credit granted 
to employers as an incentive to encourage increased 
employment of the disadvantaged would cause employers to 
9 replace regular employees with tax credit employees. To 
see whether or not employers expect such abuse of a human 
resource tax credit, the employers surveyed in this study 
were asked to respond to the following statement: 
If granted a tax credit to hire certified 
individuals, employers would abuse the 
credit by replacing regular employees with 
tax credit employees. · 
9American Federation of Labor and Congress qf 
Industrial Organizations, The AFL-CIO Platform Pro~osals, 
presented to the Republican and Democratic Conventions, 
1968, p. 4. 
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Responses were receiveq from 224 firms. The frequency and 
percentage distributions of the responses are presented in 
Table V. 
sununary of Results 
The data in Table V show that a majority of the Dun 
and Bradstreet firms (82 percent) and Oklahoma firms (67 
percent) do not agree with the contention that employers 
would abuse a tax credit incentive for employing disadvan-
taged individuals by replacing regular employees with disad-
vantaged individuals. The signif icarit D values shown in the 
table for the responses of both samples indicate that there 
is less than five percent probability that these firms wou:td 
have responded in this manner if the populations represen:ed 
by the two samples were evenly divided in their attitudes 
toward the statement. Hypothesis Vis therefore rejected 
for both the Dun and Bradstreet and Oklahoma firms. Based 
on these results it seems reasonable to conclude that a 
majority of both large and small employers feel that a tax 
credit incentive to hire the disadvantaged would not cause 
employers to replace regular employees with employees which 
qualify the employer for a tax credit. 
The D values in Table V show that Hypothesis 5 is 
also rejected for all the subsamples of Dun and Bradstreet 
firms and for the construction and food subsamples of 
Oklahoma firms. Although the D values show that the 
responses of the industrial and miscellaneous subsamples 
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TABLE V 
FREQUENCY AND PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF EMPLOYERS' RESPONSES TO 
STATEMENT SPECIFYING THAT EMPLOYERS WOULD ABUSE A TAX CREDIT 
BY REPLACING REGULAR EMPLOYEES WITH TAX CREDIT EMPLOYEES 
Dun and Bradstreet Firms 
Manu- Wholesale- Utility-
facturins Retail TransEorta tion Financial Total 
Type of Response ~ (%)b N (%) N (%) N (%) N (%) 
Strong Agreement 3 ( 5) 0 ( 0) 0 ( 0) 1 ( 7) 4 ( 3) 
Moderate Agreement 4 ( 6) 0 ( 0) 3 (15) 1 ( 7) 8 ( 7) 
Slight Agreement 6 ( 9) 1 (10) 1 ( 5) 1 ( 7) 9 ( 8) 
Total Agreement 13 (20) 1 (10) 4 (20) 3 (21) 21 (18) 
Slight Disagreement 11 (16) 2 (20) 0 ( 0) 0 ( 0) 13 (12) 
Moderate Disagreement 17 (25) 0 ( 0) 3 (15) 3 (22) 23 (21) 
Strong Disagreement 26 (39) 7 (70) 13 (65) 8 (57) 54 (49) 
Total Disagreement 54 (80) 9 (90) 16 (80) 11 (79) 90 (82) 
Total Responses 67 (100) 10 (100) 20 (100) 14 (100) 111 (100) 
D Values .308* .533* .483* .452* .360* 
Oklahoma Firms 
Con- Indus- Misc el-
struction trial Food laneous Total 
Type of Response N (%) N (%) N (%) N (%) N (%) 
Strong Agreement 0 ( 0) 4 (11) 5 (23) 4 ( 9) 13 (11) 
Moderate Agreement. 0 ( 0) 1 ( 3) 0 ( 0) 7 (17) 8 ( 7) 
Slight Agreement 3 (27) 6 (16) 3 (13) 5 (12) 17 (15) 
Total Agreement 3 ~27) 11 (30) 8 (36) 16 (38) 38 (33) 
Slight Disagreement 1 ( 9) 7 (18) 5 (23) 8 (19) 21 (19) 
Moderate Disagreement 4 (37) 7 (18) 7 (32) 7 (17) 25 (22) 
Strong Disagreement 3 (27) 13 (34) 2 ( 9) 11 (26) 29 (26) 
Total Disagreement 8 (73) 27 (70) 14 (64) 26 (62) 75 (67) 
Total Responses 11 (100) 38 (100) 22 (100) 42 (100) 113 (100) 
D Values .333* .211 .364* .119 .164* 
*D value is significant at the .OS level. (See Siegel, Nonparametric Statistics, 
Table E, p. 251. 
aNumber of Responses 
bPercent of Total Responses 
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of Oklahoma firms are not statistically significant, 71 
percent of the industrial firms and 62 percent of the 
miscellaneous firms disagree with the statement. overall, 
the responses from the various subsamples indicate that 
employers, regardless of the nature of their business, 
are in disagreement with the contention that employers 
would abuse a human resource tax credit by replacing 
regular employees with tax credit employees. 
Implications of R~su~ts 
The above results indicate that there may be little 
need to be concerned that a human resource tax credit will 
result in the replacement of regular employees. In inter-
preting these results it should be kept in mind, however, 
that the questionnaire statement on potential employer 
abuse could ha_ve been looked at by respondents as a 
statement akin to asking them if they would cheat if given 
the chance. Therefore, to the.extent respondents answered 
the statement from the point of view of what they might 
do as employers, rather than on the basis of what they 
thought other employers might do, the above results 
probably reflect a-bias toward disagreement with the 
statement. Restrictions of union contracts were also a 
likely reason for some respondents' attitudes toward the 
statement on employer abuse. One employer did, in fact, 
note that.his ability to add tax credit employees to his 
work force was limited by the nature of the company's 
contract with the union. 
Employers' Attitudes on the Use of Employee Turnover 
as an Employer Eligibility Requirement 
for a Human Resource Tax Credit 
Hypothesis 6: Employers do not.have significant 
attitudes with regard to the use of employee 
turnover as an employer eligibility requirement 
for a human resource tax credit. 
One potential device for limiting the potential 
abuse of a tax credit through employers' replacement of 
regular employees with tax credit employees is to require 
that employers maintain a labor turnover ratio below a 
75 
specified maximum in order to be eligible for a tax credit. 
To see if employers consider such a device feasible and 
effective, the employers surveyed in this study were asked 
to respond to the following statement: 
A feasible and effective device for preventing 
the above type of employer abuse /the preceding 
statement referred to potential employer abuse 
through replacement of regular employee~ would 
be to grant the tax credit only to employers 
with an employee turnover rate below a 
specified maximum. 
The frequency and percentage distributions of the 224 
responses to the above statement are presented in Table VI. 
Summary of Results 
The data in Table VI show that 77 percent of the 
Dun and Bradstreet firms disagree with the statement on 
TABLE VI 
FREQUENCY ANIJ PE!(CENTAGE IJ IS'l'I( f!IUTION OF E~U'J.OYERS' RESPONSES TO 
STATEMENT SPECIFY INC TIIAT EMP!.OYER AI\USE OF A TAX CREDIT 
COULll BE PREVENTED BY BASIN<: ELIGTllILITY FOR THE 
CREDIT ON THE EMPLOYERS' EMPLOYEE TURNOVER RATE 
Dun and Bradstreet Firms 
Manu- Wholesale- Utility-
facturing Retail Trans2ortation Financial 
Type of Response Na ('7.)b N (%) N (%) N (%) 
Strong Agreement 3 ( 5) 0 ( O) 0 ( 0) 0 ( 0) 
Moderate Agreement 3 ( 5) 1 (10) 1 ( 5) 0 ( 0) 
Slight Agreement 11 .ill2. __! i!Ql ...!!. .EQl __! 1..l.l 
Total Agreement 17 (27) 2 (20) (25) 1 ( 7) 
Slight Disagreement 12 (18) f (20) 2 (10) 1 ( 7) 
Moderate Disagreement 13 (19) 0 ( 0) 5 (25) 2 (15) 
Strorig Disagreement 24 D.£2. ~ i§Ql __§_ ..0Ql .!Q illl 
Total. Disagreement 49 (73) 8 (80) 15 (75) 13 (93) 
Total Responses 66 (100) 10 (100) 20 (100) 14 (100) 
D Values .242* .433* ,317* .548* 
Oklahoma Firms 
Con- Indus- Miscel-
struction trial Food laneous 
Type of Response N (%) N (%) N (%) N (%) 
Strong Agreement 2 (18) 5 (13) 4 (17) 10 (24) 
Moderate Agreement 1 (10) 6 (16) 3 (13) 8 (19) 
Slight Agreement ...1. .illl .!l ~ _]_ .QQ2. ..1 Q!2_ 
Total Agreement 5 (46) 24 (63) 14 (60) 27 (64) 
Slight Disagreement 2 (18) 3 ( 8) 1 ( 4) 2 ( 5) 
Moderate Disagreement 2 (18) 6 (16) 4 (18) 4 (10) 
Strong Disagreement ...1. .illl -2. illi ....!!. .illl ..1 Q!2_ 
Total Dhagreement 6 (54) 14 (37) 9 (40) 15 (36) 
Total Responses 11 (100) 38 (100) 23 (100) 42 (100) 
D Values .061 .132 .109 .143 
Total 
N (%) 
3 ( 3) 





















*D value is significant at the .05 level •. (See Siege 1, Nonearametric Statistics, 
Table E, p. 251,) 
aNumber of Responses 
brercent of Total Responses 
76 
77 
employee turnover. The significant D value at the .05 
level means that Hypothesis 6 is rejected for these firms. 
On the basis of these results it is concluded with at 
least 95 percen~ probability that a majority of the popu-
lation of Dun and Bradstreet firms are against employee 
turnover as an eligibility requirement. The data for the 
Oklahoma firms show that 61 percent of these firms favor 
employee turnover as an eligibility requirement. However, 
the insignificant D value at the .05 level means that 
Hypothesis 6 is not rejected for these firms. Therefore, 
there is at least a five percent probability that the 
population of Oklahoma firms is evenly divided with regard 
to the statement on employee turnover. These results show 
a marked difference b~tween the attitudes of the Dun and 
Bradstreet and Oklahoma employers. A cormnent received 
from a Dun and Bradstreet respondent indicates that large 
firms may have envisioned more problems on the use of 
turnover than could be foreseen by many of the Oklahoma 
respondents. The cormnent made note of a problem of 
variation in turnover rates among different divisions of 
the company. 
The D values in Table II are significant f~r all 
the subsamples of Dun and Bradstreet firms indicating 
rejection of Hypothesis 6 for these firms. Thus, the 
nature of the firm's business appears to have little 
effect, if any, on the attitudes of Dun and Bradstreet 
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employers toward turnover as an eligibility requirement. 
Although the D values are insignificant for all Oklahoma 
subsamples, the data do indicate that business activity may 
have some effect on the attitudes of the construction firms. 
Whereas disagreement with the statement on employee turnover 
ranges from 36 to 40 percent among the industrial, food, 
and miscellaneous firms; 54 percent of the construction 
firms disagree with the statement. If the construction 
firms are more susceptible to seasonal peaks and troughs 
in their business cycle than the other subsamples of 
Oklahoma firms, it is understandable that their attitudes 
would be more negative toward the use of employee turnover 
as an eligibility requirement for the tax credit. 
Implications of Results 
The negative responses to the statement on turnover 
from the Dun and Bradstreet employers indicate that this 
type of requirement may not be the best means of controlling 
employer abuse of a human resource tax credit. Of course, 
a turnover requirement would limit to some extent, depending 
upon its stringency, participation in the tax incentive . 
. (Employers' estimates of how stringent a turnover require-
ment should be are analyzed in Chapter V.) Since 
replacement of regular employees with tax credit employees 
increases the employer's turnover ratio, a turnover 
requirement would also have the desired effect of 1imiting 
employer abuse of a tax incentive program. However, if a 
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turnover requirement prevents large national firms with 
facilities to provide sound training for the disadvantaged 
from participating in a tax incentive program, perhaps 
better control procedures can be found. For example, 
spot checks by investigators employed under the Fair Labor 
Standards Act as suggested in a presidential task force 
. report, might provide sufficient control over large 
10 
employers' participation in a tax crSdit program. 
The fact that the Oklahoma employers are not signifi-
cantly against employee turnover as an eligibility 
requirement indicates that this may be an acceptable device 
for preventing small employers from using the tax credit to 
obtain temporary labor. However, such control can also be 
provided by recapture of the tax credit. For example, the 
recently enacted tax credit on wages paid persons employed 
under the Work Incentive Program provides for a recapture 
of the credit if the employee is dismissed without cause. 11 
Of course, a turnover requirement would reduce partic-
ipation by firms with seasonal peaks and troughs in 
employment, as does a recapture provision. In this 
connection, if employment which may be temporary is felt 
to be better than no employment for the disadvantaged 
lOsee U.S. Department of Labor, Manpower Administra-
tion, A Government Commitment to Occupational Training in 
Industry(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 
August, 1968) p. 104. 
11 See, Explanation of Revenue Act of 1971, p. 60. 
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individual, the likely exclusion of seasonal and other 
employers susceptible to high turnover rates is an obvious 
disadvantage of the recapture provision and of using 
employee turnover as an eligibility requirement for a 
human resource tax credit. 
Summary 
The research findings described in the preceding pages 
provide insight into employers' attitudes on a human 
resource tax credit. These findings indicate that: 
(1) A majority of employers regardless of their size 
or the nature of their business, prefer a tax credit mode 
of reimbursement over contractual reimbursement for 
employing disadvantaged individuals. 
(2) A majority of employers, regardless of their size 
or the nature of their business, think a tax credit based 
on wages could be feasible and effective in encouraging 
increased employment of disadvantaged individuals. 
(3) A majority of small firms, regardless of the 
nature of their business, think a tax credit on costs 
incurred to relocate disadvantaged individuals from a 
labor surplus area to the employer's labor market area 
could be a feasible and effective device for encouraging 
employers to pay such costs. 
(4) Large national firms are divided in their 
opinions on whether a tax credit on relocation costs 
paid for disadvantaged individuals could be a feasible 
and effective device for encouraging employers to pay 
such costs. 
(5) A majority of employers, regardless of their 
size or the nature of their business, think a tax credit 
on educational costs paid for disadvantaged individuals 
could be a feasible and effective device for encouraging 
employers to pay such costs~ 
(6) A majority of employers, regardless of the 
size or the nature of their business, feel that employers 
would not abuse a tax credit incentive, intended to 
increase employment of disadvantaged individuals, by 
replacing regular employees with tax credit employees. 
(7) A majority of large national firms are against 
the use of employee turnover as a criterion to establish 
employer eligibility for a human resource tax credit. 
(8) Small firms are somewhat uncertain as to the 
feasibility and effect of using employee turnover as a 
criterion to establish employer eligibility for a human 
resource, tax credit. 
On the basis of the research findings, there is 
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reason to believe that more business firms will participate 
in the· employment and training of the disadvantaged under 
a tax credit financial incentive than under a financial 
incentive involving a government contract. The findings 
indicate that employers are very much concerned with the 
administrative simplicity of a reimbursement mode. The 
findings also indicate that a tax credit on relocation 
costs and educational costs can be successful in encour-
aging employers to provide disadvantaged persons with 
.greater job mobility and educational opportunities. 
Moreover, the findings indicate that a tax credit would 
not be subject to "wide-scale" employer abuse as some 
people fear. Although the findings indicate that the use 
of employee turnover as an eligibility criterion may not 
be a necessary or effective device for control over the 
participation of large firms in a tax credit program, the 
findings do indicate that the use of an employee turnover 
ratio may be effective for controlling participation in a 
tax credit by small employers who may only be interested 
in obtaining inexpensive labor for a short duration. 
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The following chapter examines employers' numerical 
estimates on the tax credit base and employer eligibility 
criteria; the magnitude of credit rates on wages, relocation 
costs, and educational costs; and the potential effect of 
a wage tax credit on employment and on tax revenue. In 
addition, the following chapter examines employers' 
attitudes on their ability to adapt their employment 
plans to changes in the magnitude of a tax credit. 
CHAPTER V 
FINDINGS AND IMPLICATIONS RELATED TO EMPLOYERS' ESTIMATES 
ON TAX CREDIT ELIGIBILITY, BASE, RATE, AND EFFECT 
The previous chapter reported employers' attitudes 
on the desirability and nature of a tax credit to encourage 
on-the-job training of the disadvantaged. The findings and 
implications of the research results reported in this 
chapter relate to employers' numerical estimates on cri-
teria for determining employer eligibility for a human 
resource tax credit, the base and rate structure of such a 
tax credit, and the potential effectiveness of a tax credit 
on the employment of the disadvantaged. 
In connection with employer eligibility, this chapter 
analyzes employers' estimates on what would be reasonable 
as a maximum acceptable employee turnover requirement for 
employers participating in a tax credit program. With 
regard to the base period for a tax credit on wages paid 
eligible disadvantaged employees, this chapter analyzes 
employers' estimates on the length of time wages paid such 
persons should be included in the base of a human resource 
tax credit. Also included in this chapter are employers' 
estimates on the magnitude of tax credit rates on wages, 
relocation costs, and education costs necessary for the tax 
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credit to have an effect on their decisions to employ, 
relocate, and provide training for the disadvantaged. This 
chapter also reports on employers' responses to a question 
asking them to estimate the number of disadvantaged persons 
they would add to their employment if granted a tax credit 
of the magnitude specified in their response to a previous 
question on the research instrument. Finally, this chapter 
analyzes findings related to the effect of changes in a 
human resource tax credit rate on employers' decisions to 
employ the disadvantaged and to the willingness of employers 
to provide meaningful on-the-job training for the disad-
vantaged persons they employ. 
Employers' Estimates on the Maximum Employee Turnover 
Rate Which Should be Established as an Employer 
Eligibility Requirement for the Tax Credit 
Hypothesis 7: There are no significant 
differences between Dun and Bradstreet 
and Oklahoma firms and among subsamples 
of these firms on the employee turnover 
ratio which should be established as an 
employer eligibility requirement for a 
human resource tax credit •. 
Assuming that an employee turnover requirement is to 
be used to control potential employer abuse of a human 
resource tax credit, a maximum acceptable turnover rate 
would have to be determined and also the question of whether 
a single maximum acceptable rate is suitable for businesses 
which vary significantly with respect to size and activity 
would have to be resolved. In order to obtain information 
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which might be helpful in establishing a turnover require-
ment, the different employers surveyed in this study were 
asked to respond to the following question: 
What maximum turnover rate (discharges, quits, 
etc. as a percent of average employment for 
the year) do you feel would be fair as an 
employer eligibility requirement for the 
above tax credits? 
Responses to the above question .were received from 176 
firms. The frequency and percentage distributions and 
means of th~ responses are presented in Table VII. 
Summary of Results 
The data in Table VII show that the average response 
of both Dun and Bradstreet and, Oklahoma firms on the turn:-
over rate which would be fair as an employer eligibility 
requirement is equal to 23.3 percent. Since there is no 
difference in the mean response of the two samples, the t 
value shown in the table indicates that Hypothesis 7 is 
accepted at the .05 level for the comparison between the 
two samples. Therefore, it cannot be concluded that there 
is a significant difference between the Dun and Bradstreet 
and Oklahoma populations with regard to the employee 
turnover rate that would be fair as an employer eligibility 
requirement for a tax credit. 
The mean turnover rates indicated by the various types 
of Dun and Bradstreet firms range from 16.7 percent for the 
utility-transportation firms to .40 percent for the 
wholesale-retail firms. The mean turnover rates indicated 
TABLE VII 
FREQUENCY AND PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTIONS A?ID MEANS OF EMPLOYERS' 
RESPONSES ON THE MAGNITUDE OF EMPLOYEE TURNOVER AS AN 
EMPLOYER ELIGIBILITY REQUIREMENT 
Dun and Bradstreet Firms 
Manu- Wholesale- Utilities-
facturins Retail Trans12orta tion · Financial 
·Turnover Rate (%) N8 (%)b N (%) N (%) N (%) 
1 1 ( 2) 1 ( 8) 
2 3. ( 6) 
3 3 ( 6) 
4 2 ( 4) 1 ( 8) 
5 2 ( 4) 2 (17) 
6 1 ( 2) 
10 6 .(13) .5 (42) 
12 2 ( 4) 
15 5 (11) 1 ( 8) 
18 1 ( 2) 
20 8 (17) ~ ( 8) 3 (30) 
25 2 ( 4) 3 (50) 1 (10) 
30 5 (11) 1 (17) 3 (30) 
35 1 (17) 
36 1 (10) 
40 1 ( 2) 
45 1 (10) 
50 3 ( 6) 1 (10) 
60 1 ( 2) 
100 ..l. .Lil ...! .il1l 1 .1.!l 
Total Responses 48 (100) 6 (lOl)d 12 (99)d 10 (100) 




2 ( 3) 
3 ( 4) 
3· ( 4) 
3 ( 4) 
4 ( 5) 
1 ( 1) 
11 (15) 
2 ( 3) 
6 ( 8) 
1 ( 1) 
12 (16) 
6 ( 8) 
9 (12) 
1 . ( 1). 
1 ( 1) 
1 ( 1) 
1 ( 1) 
4 ( 5) 




TABLE VII (Continued) 
Oklahoma Firms 
Construction Industrial Fciod Miscellaneous 





















1 (11) 2 ( 5) 
2 ( 6) 1 ( 5) 1 ( 3) 
1 ( 3) 1 ( 3) 
5 (15) 4 (11) 
1 ( 5) 
1 ( 3) 
l (11) 10 (30) 5 (24) 8 (22) 
1 ( 3) 
1 (11) 4 (12) 2 (10) 1 ( 3) 
1 (11) 4 (12) 5 (24) 7 (19) 
1 (11) 3 ( 9) 2 (10) 2 ( 5) 
1 (11) 3 ( 8) 
2 ( 5) 
1 (11) 
1 (11) 1 ( 3) 2 (10) 3 ( 8) 
1 ( 5) 
1 ( 3) 
1 .ll!2. 2 .i..&l 2 (10) 1 .Ll2. 
9 (99)d 33 (99)d 21 (103)d 37 (101}d 
32.33 20,82 . 29.43 20.03 
Statistics for Differences in Mean Responses: 
Among Dun and Bradstreet firms - Computed F ~ 1.97 
Among Oklahoma firms - Computed F = 1.lSc 
c 
Between Dun and Bradstreet and Oklahoma firms - Computed t c 
0 - not significant 
8 Number of Responses 
b 
Percent of Total Responses 
cNot significant.at the .05 level (See Chao, Statistics, 
Appendix IX, p. 495,) 
d Rounding of individual percentages causes total not to 




3 ( 3) 
4 ( 4) 
2 ( 2) 
9 ( 9) 
1 ( 1) 
1 ( 1) 
24 (24) 
1 ( 1) 
8 ( 8) 
17 (17) 
8 ( 8) 
4 ( 4) 
2 ( 2) 
1 ( 1) 
7 ( 7) 
1 ( 1) 




by the various types of Oklahoma firms range from 20 
percent for the miscellaneous firms to 32.3 percent for 
the construction firms. Ev.en though there is a large 
difference between the high and low means, the F values 
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indicate that the overall differences among the means are 
not significant at the .05 level for either the Dun and 
Bradstreet or Oklahoma firms. Hypothesis 7 is therefore 
accepted for the comparison of different types of firms. 
Thus, it is concluded that there is not a significant 
difference of opinion among the different types of Dun and 
Bradstreet and Oklahoma firms on the maximum acceptable 
employee turnover rate which would be fair as an 
employer eligibility requirement for a tax credit. 
Implications·of Results 
The above results indicate that if employee turnover 
is to be used as an employer eligibility requirement for 
a tax credit it may be suitable to establish a single 
maximum acceptable rate for firms diverse as to business 
size and activity since these factors do not appear to 
have a significant effect on employers' estimates on what 
would be fair as a maximum acceptable employee turnover 
rate. With regard to the magnitude of the turnover rate 
requirement, the rates indicated by employers in response 
to the survey appear to be quite stringent when compared 
to published data by the Bureau of Labor Statistics on 
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average turnover rates for manufacturers. 1 According to 
the May, 1972 issue of the Monthly Labor Review, the average 
separation (turnover) rate per month during 1971 amounted 
2 
to 4.2 separations for each 100 employees. This amounts 
to an annual rate of 50.4 percent which is considerably 
more than the 21.4 mean annual rate which the manufacturing 
firms in this survey indicate would be a fair maximum rate 
to use in determining employer eligibility for a human 
resource tax credit. Therefore, if a turnover limitation 
of the magnitude indicated by the manufacturing firms 
responding to this survey were to be adopted as an eligi-
bility requirement, it appears that many firms would not be 
eligible for participation in the tax incentive program. 
Employers' Estimates of the Base Period 
for a Tax Credit on Wages 
Hypothesis 8: There are no significant 
differences between Dun and Bradstreet and 
Oklahoma firms and among subsamples of these 
firms on the length of time wages paid 
disadvantaged employees should be covered by 
an income tax credit. 
A tax credit based on wages necessitates a determina-
tion of the period of time wages paid eligible employees 
should be covered by the tax credit. In order to determine 
1The Bureau of Labor Statistics does not publish 
employee turnover data for nonmanufacturing industries. 
2Monthly Labor Review, May, 1972, p. 96. 
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what length of time employers feel wages paid eligible 
employees should be included in the base of a human resource 
tax credit, the employers surveyed in this study were asked 
to respond to the following question: 
Over what length of time should wages paid new 
certified employees be covered by an income tax 
credit? 
The respondents were limited to the following choices: 
6 months, 1 year, l~ years, 2 years. The frequency and 
percentage distributions .and means of the 210 responses are 
presented in Table VIII. 
Summary of Results 
The data in Table VIII show that the largest frequtncy 
of responses occurs in the 12 month base period category; i.e., 
54 percent of the Dun and Bradstreet firms and 43 percent 
of the Oklahoma firms prefer a 12 month base period. The 
mean responses are 13.8 and 14.7 months for the Dun and 
Bradstreet and Oklahoma samples respectively. According 
to the. t value shown in the table, the difference between 
the means of the two samples is not significant at the .05 
level. This means that Hypothesis 8 is accepted for the 
comparison between the Dun and Bradstreet and Oklahoma firms. 
It is thus concluded that there is not a significant 
difference of opinion between the Dun and Bradstreet and 
Oklahoma populations en the length of. time wages should 
be included in the base of a.human resource tax credit. 
TABLE VIII 
FREQUENCY AND PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTIONS AND MEANS OF 
EMPLOYERS' RESPONSES ON THE BASE. PERIOD FOR A 
TAX CREDIT ON WAGES 
Manu-
facturing 




Transportation Financial Total 














3 (38) 2 
4 (50) 9 
0 3 
..i ill> ....'!.. 




(11) 2 (17) 19 (19) 
(50) 8 (67) · 55 (54) 
(17) 0 5 ( 5) 
(22) ..1 (17) 2:2 (E_) 
(100) 12 (101{ 101 (100) 
15.00 13.00 13.78 
Miscellaneous Total 







3 (27) 7 (20) 7 (31) 7 (17) 24 (22) 
6 (55) 13 (37) 10 (43) 18 (45) 47 (43) 
1 ( 9) 1 ( 3) 1 ( 4) 1 ( 3) 4 ( 4) 
1 ( 9) 14 (40) 5 (22) 14 (35) 34 C.ll) - - -
11 (100) 35 (100) 23(100) 40 (100) 109 (100) 
12.00 15.80 13.04 15.30 14.65 
Statistics for Differences in Mean Responses: 
Among Dun and Bradstreet firms - Computed F • .78c 
Among Oklahoma firms - Computed F z_ L 41 c 
Between Dun and Bradstreet and_ Oklahoma_ firms - Computed t ~ .4:zd 
8Number of Responses 
bPercent of Total Responses 
cNot significant at the .05 level (See Chao, Statistics, 
Appendix IX, p. 495.) 
dNot signifi~ant at the .05. level (See Chao, Statistics, 
Appendix IV, p. 490.) 
~ounding of individual percentages causes total not to 
equal 100 percent. 
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The means of the responses among the various types 
of Dun and Bradstreet firms range from 11.3 months for 
the wholesale-retail firms to 15 months for the utility-
transportation firms. The means of the responses among the 
various types of Oklahoma firms range from 12 months for 
the construction firms to 15.8·months for the industrial 
firms. The F values shown in the table indicate that the 
differences among the means are not significant at the 
.05 level for either the Dun and Bradstreet or Oklahoma 
firms. Hypothesis 8 is therefore accepted for the 
comparison bf the different types of firms. Thus, it 
cannot be concluded that there is a significant difference 
among the different types of firms with regard to length 
of time wages paid disadvantaged employees should be 
included in the base of a human resource tax credit. 
Implications of Results 
Under the 20 percent Work Incentive Program Credit 
included in the 1971 Revenue Act, a tax credit is granted 
on wages paid to eligible disadv.antaged employees during 
the first 12 months of their employment. The above 
results indicate that a 12 month period for.including 
wages paid eligible employees in the base of a human 
resource tax credit is preferred by more employers than 
a 6 month, 18 month, or 24 month period. Therefore, it 
appears that the 12 ~onth base period included in the 
work incentive credit is sufficiently long so that 
participation in the program will not be significantly 
affected because of this factor. The insignificant t 
and F values indicated in the above results also support 
the use of a uniform base period for firms diverse as 
to size and business activity. 
Employers' Estimates of the Necessary Magnitude 
of a Tax Credit on Wages 
Hypothesis 9: There are no significant 
differences between Dun and Bradstreet and 
Oklahoma firms and among subsamples of these 
firms on the rate that should be established 
for a tax credit on wages. 
The magnitude of the tax credit rate is of utmost 
importance in inducing employers to participate in a 
tax credit program for on-the-job training of the 
disadvantaged. To gain insight into the rate magnitude 
necessary in order for a human resource tax credit to 
have an effect on the employment decision, the employers 
surveyed were asked to respond to this question: 
What percent of wages would a tax credit have 
to be in order for it to affect your decision 
to employ certified individuals? 
The frequency and percentage distributions and means 




FREQUENCY AND PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTIONS AND MEANS 
OF EMPLOYERS' RESPONSES ON THE MAGNITUDE OF 
A TAX CREDIT ON WAGES 
Dun and Bradstreet Firms 
Manu- Wholesale- Utilities-
facturing Retail Transportation Financial Total 
Credit Rate (%) Na (%)b N (%) N (%) N (%) N (%) 
5 1 ( 2) 1 ( 1) 
10 3 ( 5) 3 ( 3) 
15 1 ( 2) 1 ( 1) 
17.5 1 ( 2) 1 ( 1) 
20. 3 ( 5) 4 (25) 2 (18) 9 (10) 
25 7 (12) 2 (25) 1 ·c 6) 1 ( 9) 11 (12) 
30 1 ( 2) 1 ( 1) 
33 1 ( 2) 2 (25) 3 ( 3) 
37.5 1 ( 2) 1 ( 1) 
40 1 ( 9) 1 ( 1) 
50 24 (41) 4 <so) 9 (56) 3 (27) 40 (43) 
60 2 ( 3) 1 ( 9) 3 ( 3) 
62.5 3 ( 5) 3 ( 3) 
70 1 ( 2) 1 ( 1) 
75 4 ( 7) 1 ( 6) 1 ( 9) 6 ( 7) 
80 1 ( 9) 1 ( 1) 
90 1 ( 2) 1 ( 1) 
100 4 ( 7) 1 {...&.) ..1. U> ...§. U> 
Total Responses 58 (lOl)e .8 (100) 16 (99)e 11 (99)e 93(100) 
Mean Response 47.76 39.5 45.63 51.82 47.16 






















TABLE IX (Continued) 
Oklahoma Firms 














2 ( 6) 
1 ( 3) 
4 (12) 
9 (27) 
3 ( 9) 
2 ( 6) 
2 ( 6) 
5 (15) 
1 ( 3) 
1 ( 3) 
1 ( 3) 
2 ( 6) 
N (%) N (%) 
1 ( 5) 
3 (14) 1 ( 3) 
1 ( 5) 
1 ( 5) 3 ( 8) 
1 ( 5) 9 (23) 
3 (14) 
1 ( 3) 
2 ( 5) 
7 (33) 14 (36) 
1 ( 5) 
1 ( 3) 
2 ( 5) 
3 (14) 6 (15) 
10 (100) 33 (99)e 21(100) 39 (lOl)e 
41. 70 38.52 42.03 49.13 
Statistics for Differences in Mean Responses: 
Among Dun and Bradstreet firms - Computed F = .49c 
Among Oklahoma firms - Computed F = 1.02c 
Between Dun and Bradstreet and Oklahoma firms - Computed t = 1. oi 
aNumber of Responses 
bPercent of Total Responses 
cNot significant at .05 level (See Chao, Statistics, 
Appendix IX, p. 495.) 
dNot significant at .05 level (See Chao, Statistics, 
Appendix IV, p. 490.) 
Total 
N (%) 
1 ( 1) 
4 ( 4) 
3 ( 3) 
1 ( 1) 
1 ( 1) 
10 (10) 
20 (19) 
6 ( 6) 
3 ( 3) 
2 ( 2) 
2 ( 2) 
30 (29) 
1 ( 1) 
1 ( 1) 
1 ( 1) 
4 ( 4) 
1 ( 1) 




eRounding of individual. percentages causes total not to equal 100 percent. 
Summary of Results 
The data in Table IX show that the largest 
frequency of responses occurs at the 50 percent credit 
rate;i.e~ percent of the Dun and Bradstreet firms and 
29 percent of the Oklahoma firms think that a tax credit 
of 50 percent of the wages paid eligible employees wouJ.d 
be sufficient for the credit to affect their employment 
decision. The mean rates are 47.2 percent and 43.6 
percent for the Dun and Bradstreet and Oklahoma firms 
respectively. The t value computed for the difference 
between these means is not significant at the .05 level. 
Hypothesis 9 is accepted for the comparison between the 
Dun and Bradstreet and Oklahoma firms. On the basis 
of this result it is concluded that there is no 
significant difference of opinion between the Dun and 
Bradstreet and Oklahoma populations with regard to the 
rate magnitude which will be necessary in order for a 
tax credit to affect their decision to employ individuals 
eligible for tax credit employment. 
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The means of the responses from the various types of 
Dun and Bradstreet firms range from a 39.5 percent credit 
rate for the wholesale-retail firms to a 51.8 percent credit 
rate for the financial firms. The means of the responses 
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from the various types of Oklahoma firms range from a 38.5 
percent credit rate for the industrial firms to a 49.1 
percent credit rate for miscellaneous firms. The F values 
in the table indicate that the differences among the means 
are not significant at the .05 level for either the Dun and 
Bradstreet or Oklahoma firms. This means that Hypothesis 
9 is accepted for the comparison of the different types of 
firms. Therefore, it is concluded that there is no signif-
icant difference of opinion among the different types of 
Dun and Bradstreet and Oklahoma firms with regard to the 
rate magnitude necessary for a human resource tax credit on 
wages to be effective. 
Implications o~ Results 
The 1971 Work Incentive Program Credit on wages paid 
eligible employees provides for a tax credit rate of 20 
percent. The results'of this survey indicate that a credit 
' \ 
rate of 20 percent may~ot be sufficient to induce the 
participation of the majority of business firms in the Work 
Incentive Program Credit. Only l~ percent of the Dun and 
Bradstreet firms and only 20 percent of the Oklahoma firms 
indicate that tax credit rates of 20 percent or below would 
affect their decision to employ eligible disadvantaged 
individuals. The fact that the means of the credit rate 
responses from the different samples and subsamples were not 
significantly different does support, however,.the use 
of one credit rate as in the Work Incentive Program 
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Credit for firms diverse as to business size and activity. 
Employers' Estimates of the Necessary Magnitude 
of a Tax Credit on Relocation Costs 
Hypothesis 10: There are no significant 
differences between Dun and Bradstreet and 
Oklahoma firms and among subsamples of these 
firms on the rate that should be established 
for a tax credit on costs incurred by employers 
to relocate disadvantaged individuals to the 
employer's labor market .area. 
In Chapter IV it was reported that a majority of both 
the Dun and Bradstreet and Oklahoma employers think that 
a tax credit on relocation costs could be a feasible and 
effective device for encouraging employers to relocate 
disadvantaged persons from a labor surplus area to the 
employer's labor market area. To obtain insight into the 
magnitude of the credit rate necessary in order for a tax 
credit on relocation costs to be effective, the employers 
surveyed were asked to respond to the following question: 
What percent would a tax credit on relocation 
expenses have to be in order for it to affect 
your decision to pay such expenses for certified 
employees? 
Table X presents the frequency and percentage 
distributions and means of the 179 responses. 
Summary of Results 
The data in Table X show that most of the employers 
(68 percent of the Dun and Bradstreet firms and 58 percent 













FREQUENCY AND PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTIONS AND MEANS 
OF EMPLOYERS' RESPONSES ON THE MAGNITUDE 
OF A TAX CREDIT ON RELOCATION COSTS 
Dun and Bradstreet Firms 
Manu- Wholesale- Utility-
facturgi_g Retnil Transeortation 
Na (%)b N (%) N ('Yo) 
2 ( 4) 1 ( 7) 
1 ( 2) 1 (14) 
1 ( ll~) 2 (13) 
1 ( ll~) 
13 (24) 1 ( 7) 





1 ( 10) 
38 ill) 4 (57) 10 ill) ...l (...J.Q) 
55 (lOl)e 7 (99)e 15 (lOl)e 10 ( 100) 




3 ( 3) 
2 ( 2) 
3 ( 3) 
1 ( 1) 
1 ( 1) 
15 (17) 





TABLE X (Continued) 
Oklahoma Firms· 
Con- fodus- Miscel-
struction trial Food laneous Total 
Credit Rate (%) N a- (%)b N (%) N (%) N (%) N (%) 
5 1 ( 5) 1 1) 
8 1 ( 5) 1 1) 
10 1 ( 5) 1 1) 
20 1 ( 11) 1 ( 5) 2 2) 
25 1 (11) 3 (10) 2 ( 10) 1 ( 3) 7 8) 
30 1- ( 3) 1 ( 5) 2 ( 2) 
40 1 ( 3) 1 ( 1) 
50 2 ( 22) 6 (20) 1 5) 8 (24) 17 ( 18) 
60 1 ( 3) 1 ( 1) 
75 1 ( 3) 3 ( 9) 4 ( 4) 
.80 1 ( 5) 1 ( 1) 
85 1 ( 3) 1 ( 1) 
100 .2. (.ll) 1l <m 11 @ 20 iill 53 i..W 
Total Responses 9 (99)e 30 (99)e 20 ( 100) 33 ( 100) 92 (99)e 
Mean Response 71.66 76.00 67.65 82.90 76.23 
Statistics for Differences in Mean Responses: 
Among Dun and Bradstreet firms - Computed F = .37c 
Among Oklahoma firms - Computed F = 1.13c 
.49d Between Dun and Bradstreet and Oklahoma firms - Computed t = 
aNumber of Responses 
bPercent of Total Responses 
cNot significant at .OS level (See Chao, Statistics, Appendix IX, P· l,95.) 
dNot significant at .05 level (See Chao, Statistics, Append ix VI, p. L,90.) 
eRounding of individual percentages causes total not to equal 100 percent. 
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percent in order for a tax credit on relocation costs to 
have an effect on their decision to pay such costs for 
disadvantaged individuals. The mean rates are 82.4 percent 
and 76.2 percent for the Dun and Bradstreet and Oklahoma 
firms respectively. The t value computed for the signif-
icance of the difference between these means is not signif-
icant at the .05 level. Therefore, Hypothesis 10 is 
accepted for the comparison between the Dun and Bradstreet 
and Oklahoma firms. It is thus concluded that the Dun and 
Bradstreet and Oklahoma firms do not have significantly 
different opinions on the rate magnitude which will be 
necessary to make a tax credit on relocation costs effective. 
The means of the responses from the various types of 
Dun and Bradstreet firms range from a credit rate of 73.3 
percent for the wholesale-re'tail firms to 87 percent for the 
financial firms. The means of the responses from the var-
ious types of Oklahoma firms range from a credit rate of 
67.7 percent for the food firms to 82.9 percent for the 
miscellaneous firms. The F values shown in the table 
indicate that the differences among the means are not 
significant at the .05 level. Hypotheses 10 is therefore 
accepted for the comparison of the different types of firms. 
Thus, it can be concluded that there is not a significant 
difference of opinion among the different types of firms 
with regard to the rate magnitude necessary to make a tax 
credit on relocation costs effective. 
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Implications of Results 
The above results indicate that employers are hesitant 
to bear much, if any, of the cost to relocate the 
disadvantaged from a labor surplus area to the employer's 
labor market. As was indicated in Chapter IV, many of the 
employers surveyed in this study are located in labor 
markets where the supply of individuals meeting the criteria 
to be classified as disadvantaged is more than adequate. 
Obviously, employers in such areas see little reason for 
attracting additional disadvantaged persons to their labor 
market area. It is therefore understandable that for a tax 
credit to be an inducement for such employers to pay 
relocation costs for the disadvantaged, the tax.credit rate 
would have to be of a magnitude sufficient to provide a 
reimbursement of most, if not all, of the employer's outlay. 
Indeed, if a credit rate of 82.4 percent (~ean credit rate 
indicated by the Dun and Bradstreet firms) were to be 
granted on relocation costs it would mean that most 
taxpayers would actual3:y realize an after tax saving on the 
payment of such costs. To illustrate, assume a corporation 
subject to a 48 percent income tax pays $100 in relocation 
costs which qualify for an 82.4 percent tax credit. If such 
a credit is·legislated in a manner similar to the work 
incentive tax credit, the corporation.would be able to 
deduct the $100 in arriving at taxable income yielding a· 
tax saving of $48 (48 percent tax rate would be applied 
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against a $100 lower pase). In addition, the corporation 
would pe able to reduce its computed tax liability by 
$82.40 - the amount of the tax credit. Therefore, the 
corporation would realize total tax savings of $130.40 
offsetting the initial $100 expenditure. 
The results in Table X also indicate that firm 
size or business activity are not significant factors 
affecting the magnitude of a tax credit on relocation 
costs which will be necessary for the credit to affect 
the employer's decision. 
Employers' Estimates of the Necessary Magnitude 
of a Tax Credit on Education Costs 
Hypothesis 11: There are no significant 
differences between Dun and Bradstreet and 
Oklahoma firms and among subsamples of these 
firms on the rate that should be established 
for a tax credit on educational costs paid 
for disadvantaged employees. 
It was reported in Chapter IV that a majority of the 
Dun and Bradstreet and Oklahoma employers think that a tax 
credit on educational costs could be a feasible and effec-
tive device for encouraging employers to pay such costs for 
disadvantaged individuals. To obtain information on the 
rate at which a tax credit on educational costs would have 
to be established·in order for it to have an effect on 
employers' decisions to pay such costs, the employers 
surveyed were asked to respond to the following question: 
What percent would a tax credi_t on tuition, books, 
etc., have to be in order for it to affect your 
decision to pay such costs for certified employees? 
104 
The fr~quency and percentage distributions and means 
of the 172 responses are presented in Table XI. 
Summary of Results 
The results in Table XI ·show that a significant percent 
cf the employers (33 percent of the Dun and Bradstreet 
employers and 43 percent of the Oklahoma employers) feel 
that it would take a tax credit rate of 100 percent in 
order for a tax credit on educational costs to have an 
effect on their decision to pay such costs for their 
disadvantaged employees. The mean rates are 66.1 percent 
for the Dun and Bradstreet firms and 67.6 percent for the 
Oklahoma firms. The t value computed for the significance 
of the difference between these means is not significant 
at the .05 level. Therefore, Hypothesis 11 is accepted 
for the comparison between these two samples. It cannot 
be concluded that there is a significant difference of 
opinion between the two populations on the rate magnitude 
which will be necessary to make a tax credit on 
educational costs effective. 
The means of the responses from the sample of Dun and 
Bradstreet firms range from 64 percent for the manufac-
turing firms to 80.6 percent for the financial firms and 
for the Oklahoma sample from 60.6 percent for the food 
firms to 75.1 percent for the miscellaneous firms. The 
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TABLE XI 
FREQUEN_CY AND PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTIONS AND MEANS 
OF EMPLOYERS' RESPONSES ON THE MAGNITUDE OF A 
. TAX CREDIT ON EDUCATION COSTS 
Dun and Bradstreet Firms 
Manu- Wholesale- Utilities-
facturing Retail Trans2ortation Financial Total 
Credit Rate (%) Na (%)b N (%) N (%) N (%) N (%) 
5 1 ( 2) 1 ( 1) 
10 2 ( 4) 1 ( 7) 3 ( 7) 
15 1 ( 7) 1 ( 1) 
20 1 ( 2) l ( 1) 
25 2 ( 4) 1 ( 14) 3 ( 4) 
35 1 ( 2) 1 ( 1) 
40 1 ( 2) 2 ( 13) 1 13) 4 ( 5) 
48 1 ( 14) 1 ( 1) 
50 19 ( 36) 2 ( 29) 4 ( 27) 1 ( 13) 26 (31) 
60 2 ( 4) 2 ( 2) 
62.5 2 ( 4) 2 ( 2) 
75 5 ( 9) 1 ( 7) 1 ( 13) 7 ( 8) 
80 2 ( 4) 1 ( 13) 3 ( l) 
90 1 ( 2) 1 ( 1) 
100 14 (_j§.) 3 (.!tl) 6 ~) ~ UQ) 27 ill) 
Total Responses 53 (lOl)e 7 (100) 15 (lOl)e 8 (102)e 83 (99)e 
Mean Response 63.96 67.57 65.33 80.63 66.12 
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TABLE XI (Continued) 
Oklahoma Firms 
Con- Indus- Miscel-
struction trial Food laneous Total 
Credit Rate (%) Na (%)b N (%) N (%) N (%) N (%) 
6 1 ( 5) 1 ( 1) 
8 1 ( 5) 1 ( 1) 
10 1 ( 9) 1 ( 4) 2 ( 2) 
12.5 1 ( 5) 1 ( 1) 
20 1 ( 9) 2 8) 1 ( 3) 4 ( 4) 
25 2 (18) 3 ( 12) 2 ( 11) 2 ( 6) 9 (10) 
35 1 ( 4) 1 ( 1) 
40 1 ( 4) 1 ( 1) 
SQ 1 ( 9) 6 ( 23) 5 (26) 9 (27) 21 (24) 
60 1 ( 3) 1 ( 1) 
70 1 ( 9) 1 ( 5) 2 ( 2) 
73 1 3 1 ( 1) 
75 1 ( 5) 3 ( 9) 4 ( 4) 
80 1 ( 5) 1 ( 1) 
90 1 ( 4) 1 ( 1) 
100 .2 (45) l! (_ 42) 6 (32) ll ~) 38 @) 
Total Responses 11 (99)e 26 (lOl)e 19 (99)e 33 (99)e 89 (98)e 
Mean Response 63.64 65.00 60.61 75.09 67.63 
Statistics for Differences in Mean Responses: 
Among Dun and Bradstreet firms - Computed F = 1.ooc 
Among Oklahoma firms - Computed F = l.08c 
Between Dun and Bradstreet and Oklahoma firms - Computed t c .14d 
8Number of Responses 
bPercent of Total Responses 
CNot significant at the .05 level (See Chao, Statistics, Appendix IX, 
p. 495.) 
dNot significant at the .05 level (See Chao, Statistics, Appendix VI, 
p. 490) 
eRounding of individual percentages causes total not to equal 100 percent. 
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F values shown in the table indicate that the differences 
among the means are not significant at the .05 level. 
Hypothesis 11 is therefore accepted for the comparison of 
the different types of firms. Thus, it is concluded that 
there are not significantly different opinions among the 
different subsamples of firms on the rate magnitude which 
will be necessary to make a tax credit on educational costs 
effective. 
Implications of Results 
The above results indicate most employers would be 
unwilling to sustain much of the cost of providing formal 
training for their disadvantaged employees. In fact, as 
was the case with the mean rate indicated for a tax credit 
on relocation costs, corporations subject to a 48 percent 
tax rate would actually have a net after tax gain if granted 
a credit of 66.1 percent (the mean credit rate indicated by 
the Dun and Bradstreet employers) on educational 
expenditures for disadvantaged employees. for example, on 
a qualified expenditure of $100 the business deduction 
would result in a tax saving of $48 (48 percent corporate 
tax rate would be applied against a $100 lower taxable 
income amount), and the 66.1 percent tax credit would 
result in an additional tax saving of $66.10. Therefore, 
the corporation would realize total tax savings of $114.10 
offsetting the initial $100 expenditure. This assumes 
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that the credit would be legislated in a manner similar 
· to the work incentive tax credit under which the taxpayer 
is entitled to both the credit and the expense deduction. 
The results in Table XI also indicate that a tax 
credit on educational costs of a given magnitude will have 
approximately the same effect on the decisions of business 
firms which are diverse as to size and activity. 
Employers' Estimates on the Effect of a Tax Credit on 
Their Employment of Disadvantaged Individuals 
In order to obtain data for estimating the potential 
effect of a human resource tax credit on employment and 
on tax revenue, the employers surveyed in this study were 
asked to respond to the following statement: 
Estimate the number of certified individuals 
your firm would add to its present employment 
if granted a tax credit for the length of time 
and rate you have indicated in the preceding 
questions. 
The responses of the 168 firms which responded to the above 
statement are tabulated in Table XII which shows for seven 
credit rate intervals a cumulative distribution of the 
number of firms from which responses were received, present 
employment of the firms, the number of disadvantaged 
individuals which the firms estimate wduld be added to 
their employment as a result of the tax credit, and the 
estimated added employment expressed as a percent of the 
present employment for all firms providing estimates on 
the employment effect. 
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TABLE XII 
EMPLOYERS' ESTIMATES OF THE DISADVANTAGED 
INDIVIDUALS WHICH WOULD BE EMPLOYED AS A 
RESULT OF A HUMAN RESOURCE TAX CREDITa 
Dun and Bradstreet Oklahoma 
Added Added 
Credit Number Present Employment Number Present Employment 









(2) (3) (4) (S) (6) (7) 
2 51,500 10 7 289 
12 103,750 654 .11 16 667 
23 219,390 1,874 .31 41 2,048 
28 277 ,890 2,199 .36 46 2, 135 
62 523,534 4,497 .75 71 3,125 
74 564, 134 4,793 .80 76 3,394 
82 594,514 5,392 .90 86 4,083 
aThe data in the table is cumulative in that the data for each 
credit rate includes the data from all employers which provided es=imates 
for lower credit rates. The data are thus based on the assumption that 
an employer's estimate of the employment effect of a tax credit at ·a given 
credit rate; e.g., 10 percent, would not vary from what his estimate would 
be at a higher credit rate. Therefore,. the cumulative estimates in the 
table are conservative to the extent that employers would hire more tax 
credit eligible individuals at credit rates above the threshold rate at 
which they based their estimates. With regard to the effect of increases 









the tax credit rate (reported in Table XVI) generally support the assumption 
that increases in the tax credit rate above their threshold rate would not 
have a significant effect on the number of tax credit individuals they would 
employ. 
bEstimated number of persons which would be hired by responding firms 
as a result of the tax credit. 
CEstimated increase in employment expressed as a percent of the total 
employment for all firms which provided estimates on the employment effect 
of the tax credit; i.e., the figures in Columns 4 and 8 are related to the 
cumulative totals at the 100 percent rate in Columns 3 and 7 to derive the 










Summary of Results 
The data in Table XII indicate that employers are 
willing to add disadvantaged individuals to their payroll 
if granted a tax credit on the wages paid to such 
individuals. The data in Column 5 show that the Dun and 
Bradstreet employers might increase their employment by 
0.11 to 0.90 percent with disadvantaged persons if granted· 
a tax credit of from 20 to 100 percent on the wages paid 
such persons •. The estimated employment effect at a 10 
percent credit rate interval is insignificant. And, since 
the cate.gory contains the responses of only two of the Dun 
and Bradstreet employers, the data for the category is 
somewhat meaningless. 
The data for the Oklahoma employers show that these 
firms might increase their employment by 0.63 to 8.54 
percent with disadvantaged persons if granted a tax credit 
of from 10 to 100 percent on the wages paid such persons. 
Thus, the data show that the employment effect of a tax 
credit on present employment would be considerably more 
significant with the Oklahoma employers than it would be 
with the Dun and Bradstreet employers. One possible 
explanation for this difference is that since it is 
primarily the large firms which are participating in the 
JOBS program,3 fewer slots are available in these firms 
3sar A. Levitan, Garth L. Mangum, and Ray Marshall, 
Human Resources and Labor Markets: Labor and Manpower in the 
American Economy (New York: Harper and Row, 1972), p. 354 .• 
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for the addition of tax credit employees. Also, since the 
present employment upon which the percentage effect is 
based is much larger for the Dun and Bradstreet firms, 
these employers would have to add a very significant 
number of employees in order to match the percentage effect 
indicated by the Oklahoma employers. 
Implication of Employers' Responses for the Potential 
Effect of a Tax Credit on the Nation's Employment 
The data in Table XII provide a basis for estimating 
the potential effect of alternative tax credit rates on the 
employment of disadvantaged individuals in the nation. 
These estimates are presented in Table XIII. 
The estimates in Table XIII for the Dun and Bradstreet 
firms are based on the assumption that the 82 Dun and 
Bradstreet firms which provided estimates 'On the employment 
effect of a tax credit are representative of the population 
of Dun and Bradstreet firms. Based on this assumption, the 
percentages in Column 5 of Table XII are applied against 
the total employment for all the firms in the Dun and 
Bradstreet population (20 million which the ·Dun and 
Bradstreet Reference Book on Corporate Management indicates 
is the approximate employment for all the firms listed in 
the Directory) to derive the estimated potential effect of 
alternative tax credit rates on employment of disadvantaged 
individuals by all firms in the Dun and Bradstreet 












ESTIMATED POTENTIAL EFFECT OF A HUMAN RESOURCE TAX 
CREDIT ON THE NATION'S EMPLOYMENT 
Estimated Increase in Employment Employment 
(Thousands of Persons) Increase 
as a 
Large Firmsa Small Firmsa Total 
Percent of 
Unemploymentb 
(2) (3) (4) (5) 
291 291 5.83 
22 541 563 11. 28 
62 2,568 2,630 52.66 
72 2,794 2,866 57.40 
150 3,349 3,499 70.08 
160 3,521 3,681 73. 71 
180 3,951 4, 131 82.73 
Employment 
Increase 











aThese estimates are based on the assumption that the Dun and Bradstreet 
sample represents the nation's large ·firms and that the Oklahoma sample is 
representative of all the small firms in the nation. See the text for a detailed 
description of how these estimates are derived. 
bThe percentages in this column are derived by relating the estimates in 
Column 4 to the 4,993,000 average number of persons unemployed during 1971. (See 
Monthly Labor Review, May, 1972, p. 89.) 
cThe percentages in this colu.mn are derived by relating the estimates in 
Column 4 to the 2,918,000 families which were on AFDC (Aid to Families with 
Dependent Children) rolls as of December, 1971. (See Social Security Bulletin, 
May, 1972, p, 54.) 
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Table XIII and are identified as the potential effect of 
the alternative tax credit rates on large firms, since in 
order to be included in the Dun and Bradstreet listing the 
firms have to employ 1,000 or more people and Cor)have 
$20 million or more in sales. 
Estimates of the potential employment effect of the 
alternative tax credit rates on small firms (firms not 
included in the Dun and Bradstreet population) are given 
in·column 3 of Table.XIII. These estimates are derived by 
assuming that the estimates of the respondent Oklahoma 
firms are representative of all firms not included in the 
Dun.and Bradstreet population. The estimates in Column 3 
are computed by multiplying the percentage in Column 9 of 
· Table XII by 46,262,000. This figure represents the 
average employment during 1971 (19,120,000) Less the 
.government employees (12,858,000) and the 20,000,000 
.estimated number of employees on the payrolls of the Dun 
and Bradstreet firms. 4 
The estimates in Columns 2 and 3 of Table XIII are 
· combined in Column 4 of the· table to show the estimated 
potential national employment effect of alternative human 
resource tax credit rates. The estimates show that a tax 
credit might result in the employment of an additional 
291,000 individuals at a 10 percent rate to a possible 
additional employment O·f 4, 131, 000 individuals at a 100 
4 . 
Monthly Labor Review, May, 1972, pp. 89 and 93. 
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percent credit rate. In Column 5 of Table XIII the 
employment estimates in Column 4 are expressed as percentages 
of the 4,993,000 5 average number of individuals which were 
unemployed during 1971. Column 6 of the table shows the 
estimates in Column 4 as percentages of the 2,918,000 
families 6 which received aid under Aid to Families with 
Dependent Children (AFDC) in December, 1971. These figures 
are presented only to. give some idea of the relative poten-
tial of a tax credit and are not intended to mean that a. 
tax credit would reduce unemployment or the number of 
welfare families by the amount of the percentages shown 
in Columns 6 and 7. The macroeconomic figures on 
unemployment and welfare families include many unemployed 
persons and welfare family heads which would not be 
employed even if sufficient job openings were to be 
created by a tax credit. Many of the unemployed would not 
meet eligibility requirements (assuming eligibility is 
limited to the disadvantaged as defined by the Department 
of Labor), and some welfare recipients are disabled to the 
"7 
extent that they are unable to work. 
Obviously, the estimates in Table XIII have to be 
interpreted somewhat loosely. In the first place, the 
5Ibid. p. 89. 
6social Security Bulletin, May, 1972, p. 54. 
7In 1971 it was estimated that approximately 1 million 
of the adults in AFDC f~milies were employable. See, Charles 
L. Schultze, et al., Settin National Priorities: The 1973 
Budget (Washington: T e Brookings Institution, 1972 ~ p. 192. 
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projections are based on assumptions that the 82 Dun and 
Bradstreet firms and the 86 Oklahoma firms which provided 
estimates on the effect of a human resource tax credit on 
their employment are respectively representative of the 
large and small firms in the nation and that the 
distribution of the employment effect of the alternative 
tax credit rates as shown in Columns 5 and 9 of Table XII 
corresponds to what the distribution would be for all the 
large and small firms in the nation. A second reason for 
interpreting the estimates somewhat loosely is that what 
employers say they will do in response to a questionnaire 
survey may vary significantly from the action which would 
actually be taken. Also, even if it can be assumed that 
firms will act as they indicate at the time they respond 
to a questionnaire, the applicability of the estimates to 
later time periods is limited due to such uncertainties 
as changes in the firm's economic condition and in the 
environment within which it operates. 
Effect of a Human Resource Tax Credit 
on Income Tax Revenue 
The estimates in Table XIV provide some idea of the 
impact of a human resource tax credit on the nation's tax 
revenue for seven different tax credit rates. The estimates 
in the table are based on the assumption that employees 
hired as a result of the tax credit will be paid wages 
equal to $6,600 for a 12 month period. The $6,600 figure 
Wages 
of Tax 
· TABLE XIV 
ESTIMATED POTENTIAL EFFECT OF A HUMAN RESOURCE TAX 
CREDIT ON INCOME TAX REVENUE DURING THE FIRST 
12 MOt.'TH PERIOD OF ITS ENACTMENT 




Due to Revenue Marginal to the 
Tax Loss Product Value of 
Credit Due to Value the Tax Tax Col-





Credit Credit (Col. 1 Expense Credit Employee's from the (Columns 3 & ' 4 
Rate Employ- times Deduc- Employ- Marginal Tax Credit Minus 
(%) eesa Col. 2) tionb eesc Productd Employeese Columns 6 & 7) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
10 $ 1,921 $ 192 $ 922 $ 1, 729 $ 830 $ 168 $ 116 
20 3,716 743 1,784 2,973 1,427 326 774 
30 17 ,'358 5,207 8,332 12,151 5,832 1,523 6,184 
40 18,916 7,566 9,080 11,350 5,448 1,659 9,539 
50 23,093 11,547 11,085 11,547 5,543 2,026 15,063 
75 24,295 18,221 11,662 6,074 2,916 2,131 24,836 
100 27,265 27,265 13,087 -0- -o- 2,392 37,960 
aComputed by multiplying $6,600 times the employment estimates given in Table XIII 
for each of the tax credit rates. The $6,600 amount is based on the assumption that on 
the average the tax credit empioyees will be paid wages during the year approximately equal 
to the $126,91 average weekly earnings of nonsupervisory employees during 1971, (See, 
Monthly Labor Review, May, 1972, p, 98,) 
b Based on the assumption that all employers are corporations subject to the mar-
ginal corporate income tax rate of _48 percent. The amounts in this column are thus 
computed by multiplying the wages in Column 2 times 48 percent. 
c . 
Based on the assumption that the tax credit employee's marginal product value will 
be equal to his wage less the tax credit, (See the text for an expanded explanation of 
this computation.) 
d 48 percent marginal corporate tax rate times the estimates in Column 5. 
eComputed by multiplying $579 times the ·employment estimates given in Table XIII 
for each of the tax credit rates. $579 is the tax liability on an income of $6, 600 for 
a taxpayer cl.aiming three exemptions and head of household rates according to the 1972 
Optional Tax Tables. (See the text for an expanded discussion of this· computation,) 
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is based on the $126.91 average weekly earnings of nonsuper-
visory employees during 1971. 8 The average earnings of 
nonsupervisory employees during 1971 is probably higher 
than the average earnings of tax credit employees would 
be; however, it is felt that this figure is sufficiently 
realistic for the estimates in Table XIV, which are only 
intended to give some general idea of what the impact of 
a human resource tax credit on tax revenue might be. Also, 
since the estimates are for an annual period, it is assumed 
that the average number of tax credit employees on employers 
payrolls for the annual period will equal the estimates of 
additional employment shown in Column 4 of Table XIII. Th.1s, 
the wage figures shown in Column 2 of Table XIV are computed 
by multiplying the estimated additional employment for each 
of the credit rates, as shown in Column 4 of Table XIII, 
times $6,600. 
Column 3 of Table XIV shows the estimated tax revenue 
which would be lost as a result of the tax credit offset 
against the tax liability of employers. The estimates 
equal the rates in Column 1 times the wages in Column 2. 
The credit is the indirect payment employers would receive 
for employing disadvantaged individuals. Naturally, in 
order to receive the benefit of the tax credit, employers 
will have to have a tax liability against which the credit 
can be offset. Carryback and carryover provisions written 
8Monthly Labor Review, May, 1972, p. 98. 
118 
into the tax law can, however, minimize the number of firms 
which would not eventually receive a benefit from the tax 
credit. For example, under the Work Incentive Program 
Credit unused tax credits may be carried back to offset 
tax liabilities of three prior years and then carried 
forward to offset tax liabilities of seven succeeding years. 
In addition to the tax credit benefit, employers 
which hire disadvantaged individuals under a tax credit 
program will also be entitled to deduct the wages paid 
such persons in arriving at taxable income. The estimated 
tax revenue loss from this deduction for the wage estimates 
in Column 2 of Table XIV are given in Column 4 of the table. 
The estimates are based on the assumption that the employers 
employing the tax credit individuals are subject to the 
marginal corporate tax rate of 48 percent. Thus, the 
estimates in Column 4 are equal to the wage estimates in 
Column 2 times 48 percent. 
The estimates in Column 2 of Table XIV show that the 
tax credit offset might result in a revenue loss of from 
$192 million at a 10 percent credit rate to $27,265 million 
at a 100 percent credit rate. The estimates in Column 3 of 
Table XIV show that the expense deduction for wages paid tax 
credit employees might result in a revenue loss of from $922 
million at a 10 percent credit rate to $13,087 million at 
a 100 percent credit rate. 
The revenue losses attributable to the tax credit and 
expense deduction would be at least partially offset by tax 
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collections attributable to the value of the marginal 
product of the tax credit employees and by tax collections 
from the tax credit employees. These estimates are shown 
in Columns 6 and 7 of Table XIV. 
The estimates on the tax collections which would 
result from the marginal product of tax credit employees are 
based on the assumption that the value of the marginal 
pro~uct of these employees will equal their wage ($6,600) 
less the tax credit employers receive on this wage. 
Therefore, with a 10 percent tax credit the value of a tax 
credit employee's marginal product is assumed to be $5,940 
($6,600 minus 10 percent of $6,600). The reasoning 
supporting the above assumption is that it is felt that 
employers in providing estimates on the n'Uil1ber of 
disadvantaged individuals they would employ at the rate 
specified in response to an earlier question were planning 
to at least break even on the employment of tax credit 
employees as compared to regular employees. Thus, if an 
employer indicated he would employ disadvantaged 
individuals a:t. a 10 percent tax credit rate it is assumed 
that he thinks that the disadvantaged person will be 
90 percent as productive as an additional nondisadvantaged 
person whose marginal product value is equal to his salary. 
The estimated values of the marginal product of the 
disadvantaged individuals employers estimated they would 
hire are given in Column 5 of Table XIV. The estimated 
effect (assuming a 48 percent marginal tax rate) on tax 
collections of these marginal product values are shown in 
Column 6 of the table. The estimates range from $830 
million at a 10 percent credit rate to $2,916 million at 
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a 90 percent credit rate. These estimates indicate that a 
significant portion of the tax revenue loss resulting from 
the tax credit offset against the tax liability and from the 
wage expense deduction by participating employers might be 
offset by tax collections attributable to the additional 
revenue employers might receive from the marginal product 
of the tax credit employees. Of course, no savings are 
indicated at the 100 percent credit rate since it is assumed 
that disadvantaged persons hired by firms requiring a 100 
percent tax credit will have a zero marginal product during 
the credit period. 
The estimates in Column 7 of Table XIV show that the 
tax revenue loss of a human resource tax credit would also 
be significantly reduced by taxes collected on the earnings 
of tax credit employees. The estimates in Column 7 show 
that these collections might range from $168 million at a 
10 percent credit rate to as much as $2,392 million at a 
100 percent credit rate. The estimates are based on the 
assumption that tax collections from tax credit 
employees will average $579. $579 is the tax liability 
for a family of three with $6,600 income according 
to the 1972 Optional Tax Tables of the Internal Revenue 
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Service. 9 Obviously, many of the tax credit employees 
would be entitled to claim either more or less than three 
exemptions on their tax returns. However, in order to 
estimate the tax collections which might be received from 
tax credit employees it is necessary to assume some average 
family size (number of exemptions). Three exemptions were 
used because government data show that there are approx-
. 1 th C · · for each AFDC fami'ly. 10 imate y ree AFD recipients 
In Column 8 of Table XIV the estimates in Columns 3 and 
4 of the table were netted against the estimates in Columns 
6 and 7 of the table to derive estimates of the net effect 
of a human resource tax credit on income tax revenue. The 
estimates in Column 8 show that the revenue loss might range 
from $116 ~illion at a 10 percent tax credit rate to $37,960 
million at a 100 percent tax credit rate. It should be 
remembered that these estimates take into account only the 
initial effect of a tax credit on income tax revenue. A 
human resource tax credit will also have a "multiplier" 
effect on the gross national product and consequently income 
tax revenue of the base period year and subsequent years. 
Under the "multiplier" theory an increase in investment 
for labor as a result of the tax credit will increase 
9This tax figure is based on the assumption that the 
disadvantaged employe_e will qualify for head of household 
tax rates. 
10social Security Bulletin, May, 1972, p. 54. 
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production and national income. This in turn will stimulate 
greater demand for investment and consumer goods leading to 
still greater production creating more new income resulting 
in still more spending. The additional income resulting 
from the "multiplier" chain will of course generate 
11 
additional income tax revenue. 
Other Tax Credit Benefits Offsetting Loss in Tax Revenue 
The income tax revenue which might be lost as a result 
of a human resource tax credit would be offset at least in 
part by reduced welfare and unemployment benefits. In 
December, 1971 the average monthly AFDC payment was $188. 45'"2 
per family and unemployment benefits averaged $54.2013 per 
week. Thus, to the extent that a tax credit results in the 
removal of individuals from the AFDC or unemployment benefit 
rolls, significant savings in direct government payments 
will result. The addition of AFDC family heads and 
unemployed individuals to the ranks of the employed will 
also result in a reduction of distributions in kind; i.e., 
food, housing, and medical subsidies. For Fiscal Year 1973 
federal expenditures for distributions in kind to the 
11 For an expanded discussion of the "multiplier" 
concept see a standard economics textbook; e.g., Gardner 
Ackley, Macroeconomic Theory (Toronto: The Macmillian 
Company, 1961), pp. 312-320. 
12social Security Bulletin, May, 1972, p. 54. 
13 rbid., p. 53. 
unemployed, aged, disabled, blind, and families with 
dependent children are expected to be approximately 65 
percent of the cash distributions to such individuals. 14 
The addition of welfare recipients and unemployed 
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persons to the ranks of the employed also means additional 
payroll tax collections. In 1972 both the employer and 
employee are subject to a 5.2 percent payroll tax under 
the Federal Insurance Contributions Act (F.I.C.A.). This 
tax is imposed on the first $9,000 paid to an employee 
during the year. Thus, if a tax credit employee is paid 
$6,600 in 1972, the loss in income tax revenue from the tax 
credit would be offset by F.I.C.A. collections from the 
employee and his employer totaling $686.40 (10.4 percent 
times $6,600). In addition to F.I.C.A. taxes, most 
. employers are also subject to state and federal unemployment 
taxes on the first $4,200 paid to an employee during the 
year. The state unemployment tax rate is generally 2.7 
percent; however, this rate may vary depending on the 
various state merit rating systems which base the rate on 
the employer's labor turnover experience. The generally 
effective federal unemployment tax rate is 0.4 percent. 
Table XV shows the magnitude of the estimated benefits 
discussed in the above paragraphs assuming the employment 
estimates shown in Column 4 of Table XIII. The totals in 
Columns 8 and 9 of Table XV indicate that these other 
14 
Schultz, et al~, Setting National Priorities, p. 196. 
TABLE XV 
ESTIBATED TAX CREDIT BENEFITS OFFSETTING LOSS 
IN INCOME TAX REVENUE 
(Amounts are in Millions of Dollars) 
Savings in Cash Benefits 
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and Distributions in Kind Total Benefits 
Employ- Employ-
If Added Em- If Added Employees ees ees 
ployees were Received Unemploy- Addi- were Received 
AFDC Family Heads ment Benefits Addi- tional AFDC Unem-
tional Unem• Family ployment 
F.I.C.A, ployment Heads Benefits 
:red it Cash Distribu- Cash Distribu- Tax Tax (Total- (Totai-
Rate Distribu- tions b Distribu- tions Colle~( Collec- Columns Columns 
(%) tionsa in Kind tionsc in Kindb tions tionse 2, 3, 6& 7) 4,5,6&7) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
10 $ 658 $ 428 $ 820 $ 533 $ 200 $ 38 $ 1,324 $ 1,591 
20 1,273 827 1, 587 1,032 386 73 2,559 3,078 
30 5,947 3,866 7,412 4,818 1,805 342 11,960 14,377 
40 6,481 4,213 8,076 5,249 1,967 373 13,034 15,665 
50 7, 913 5,143 9,862 6,410 2,402 456 15,914 19,130 
75 8,324 5,411 10,375 6,744 2,527 479 16, 741 20,125 
.00 9,342 6,072 11, 643 7,568 2,836 538 18,788 22,585 
8 Computed by multiplying $188.45 (average monthly payment during 1971 to AFDC families-
see Social Security Bulletin, May, 1972, p. 54.) times 12 months times the estimated number 
of employees which would be added at each credit rate as shown in Column 4 of Table XIII. 
bEstimated to be 65 percent of cash dist.ributions - see text. 
cComputed by multiplying $54.20 (average weekly unemployment benefits during 1971 -
see Social Security Bulletin, May, 1972, p. 53.) ti.mes 52 weeks times the estimated number 
of employees which would be added at each credit rate as shown in Column 4 of Table XIII. 
d 
10,4 percent (effective FICA tax rate during 1972) times the wage estimates shown 
in Column 2 of Table XIV. 
e . 
3.1 percent (generally effective combined state and federal unemployment tax rates 
during 1972) times $4,200 (the maximum amount of wages subject to unemployment taxes) 
times the number of employees which would be added at each credit rate as shown in Column 
4 of Table XIII. 
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benefits of a tax credit can be very significant. In fact, 
at the 50 percent and lower tax credit rates these 
estimated other benefits more than offset the estimated 
loss in income tax revenue shown for these rates in Column 
8 of Table XIV. These results indicate that a human 
resource tax credit at a rate of 50 percent or below will 
actually result in a net overall saving to the government 
during the first annual period it is put into effect. Of 
course, the "multiplier" effect (discussed in the previous 
section) should result in further savings. 
Although the above discussion is not intended as an 
exhaustive list of the benefits resulting from a human 
resource tax credit, it is felt that it does make reference 
to the most significant benefits. Of course, a human 
resource tax credit would also result in some additional 
administrative costs for the Internal Revenue Service. 
Effect of Changes in Tax Credit Rate on Employers' 
Decisions to Hire the Disadvantaged 
Hypothesis 12: The opinions of employers on 
their ability to adapt their employment plans 
to changes in the magnitude of a human·resource 
tax credit rate are not statistically 
significant. 
In order to obtain some insight in'to whether the 
individual employer's demand for tax credit employees is 
elastic with regard to the tax credit rate, the employers 
surveyed in this study were asked to respond to the 
following statement: 
Your employment plans are flexible enough so 
that a significant increase in the magnitude 
of a wage tax credit in one month could have 
an effect on the number of certified unemployed 
individuals your firm would add to its payroll 
in the following month. 
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The frequency and percentage distributions of the 207 
responses to the statement are presented in Table XVI. 
Summary of Results 
The data in Table XVI show that 67 percent of the Dun 
and Bradstreet firms strongly disagree or disagree with 
the statement that they could change their employment plans. 
monthly to take into account changes in the tax credit 
rate. The majority of firms in each of the subsamples of 
Dun and Bradstreet firms also are in some degree of disa-
greement with the statement. The D values shown in the 
table are significant at the .05 level for each of the Dun 
and Bradstreet subsamples and for the overall ~ample. 
Hypothesis 12 is therefore rejected for these firms. Thus, 
it is concluded that Dun and Bradstreet employers do have 
significant negative attitudes with regard to their abil-
ity to make monthly changes· in their employment as a 
result of changes in a human resource tax credit rate. 
The data in Table XVI show that Oklahoma employers 
are somewhat negative as to the adaptability of their 
employment plans to changes in a tax credit rate. Forty 
percent of the firms in the overall Oklahoma sample are 









EMPLOYERS' RESPONSES TO STATEMENT SPECIFYING 
THAT A SIGNIFICANT CHANGE IN THE TAX CREDIT 
RATE IN ONE MONTH COULD HAVE AN EFFECT ON 
THEIR EMPLOYMENT IN THE FOLLOWING MONTH 
Dun and Bradstreet Firms 
Manu- Wholesale- Utilities-
facturing Retail Transportation 
Na (%)b N (%) N (%) 
0 < o) 1 (11) 0 < o) 
6 (10) 0 ( O) 0 < o) 
16 (26) 3 (33) 3 (16) 
19 (30) 2 (22) .7 (37) 
21 (34) 3 (33) 9 (47) 
Financial 
N (%) 
0 < o) 
0 < o) 
4 (33) 
6 (SO) 
2 · (17) 
62 (100) 9 (99)c 19 (100) 12 (100) 




1 ( 1) 






TABLE XVI (Continued) 
Oklahoma Firms 
Construction Industrial Food Miscellaneous 
Na (%)b N (%) N (%) N (%) 
Strongly Agree 0 3 ( 9) 2 ( 9) 2 ( 5) 
Agree 2 (20) 6 (18) 3 (13) 8 (20) 
Uncertain 2 (20) 10 (30) 9 (39) 21 (54) 
Disagree 2 (20) 8 (24) 5 (22) 5 (13) 
Strongly Disagree 4 (40) 6 (18) 4 (17) 3 ( 8) 
Total 
D Values 
10 (100) 33 (99)c 23(100) 39 (100) 
.200 .127 .183 .144 
*D Value is significant at the .05 level (See Siegel, 
Nonparametric Statistics, Table E, p. 251. 
aNumber of Responses 
bPercent of Total Responses 
cRounding of individual percentages causes total not to 












the firms in the sample either disagree or strongly 
disagree with the statement. The D value in the table for 
the overall Oklahoma sample shows that the distribution of 
responses is significant at the .05 level. Therefore, it 
is concluded that overall Oklahoma employers are somewhat 
negative in their attitudes on the adaptability of their 
employment plans to changes in a tax credit rate. With 
smaller samples there is a greater likelihood of error 
which requires a larger D value for statistical significan~e; 
thus, for the subsamples of the Oklahoma firms none of the 
D values are significant at the .05 level even though the 
D value for the overall sample is significant. It cannot 
be concluded therefore that the different types of 
Oklahoma firms have significant positive or negative 
attitudes on the adaptability of their employment plans 
to changes in a tax credit rate. 
Implications of Results 
The data in Table XVI show that the percentage of Dun 
and Bradstreet empioyers which disagree with the statement 
on adaptability of employment plans to changes in a tax 
credit rate is considerably greater than the percentage 
of Oklahoma firms which disagree with the statement. This 
difference indicates that small firms can more readily 
adjust their employment plans than large firms. However, 
the results in Table XVI indicate that business activity 
may have little effect on the adaptability of a firm's 
employment plans to changes in a tax credit rate. 
130 
Both the Dun and Bradstreet and Oklahoma employers 
tended to disagree with the statement that an increase in 
the tax credit rate in one month could have an effect on 
the number of tax credit eligible persons they would employ 
in the next month. This indicates that once the employer's 
threshold rate for participation in a human resource tax 
credit is reached, a higher tax credit rate might not be 
very effective in causing the employer to hire additional 
tax credit employees. 
One possibility in connection with a human resource 
tax credit is to have the tax credit rate flexible. For 
example, the rate could be set to fluctuate with changes in 
the unemployment rate. The idea behind such a tax credit is 
that it would tend to serve as an automatic stabilizer in 
the economy. For example, as the unemployment rate moves 
upward, the tax credit could be set to increase 1 percent 
for each .1 percent change in the unemployment rate. In 
connection with such a flexible tax credit, the results in 
Table XVI indicate that individual employers would not 
significantly change their employment plans to take into 
account changes in the credit rate. However, the results 
reported in Table IX. of this study show that the threshold 
rate at which employers think they would participate in a 
tax credit program varies !1mong employe.:i;:-s. Therefore, 
although an individual employer might not increase his 
employment of tax credit employees at credit rates above 
his threshold rate, higher tax credit rates would cause 
more employers to participate in the tax credit program. 
Willingness of Employers to Provide Quality 
Training for Tax Credit Employees 
One important question in connection with the 
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employment of the disadvantaged as a result of a tax credit 
is whether employers will provide such individuals with 
quality training. In order to obtain some insight into 
whether a human resource tax credit can induce employers to 
train the disadvantaged for meaningful jobs, the employers 
in this study with registered apprenticeship programs were 
asked to respond to the following questions: 
How many individuals do you currently have 
enrolled in registered apprenticeship programs? 
How many certified individuals would you aqd to 
your apprenticeship program(s} if granted a tax 
credit of the rate indicated in question 4 on the 
wages paid such persons during their apprentice 
training? 
Responses to the above questions were received from 
33 firms. The results of these responses are reported in 
Table XVII. 
Summary and Implications of Results 
The data in Table XVII for the Dun and Bradstreet and 
Oklahoma employers with apprenticeship programs indicate 
TABLE XVII 
EMPLOYERS' ESTIMATES OF THE EFFECT OF A TAX CREDIT 




Number of Responses 17 16 
Present Apprentice Employment 
of Firms Providing Estimates 802 36 
Estimated Additional Apprentice 
Employment Resulting from Tax 
Credit 278 50 
Added Apprentice Employment as 
a Percent of Present Apprentice 
Employment 34.6 138.9 
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that these employers would significantly increase their 
apprentice employment by hiring disadvantaged persons if 
granted a tax credit on the wages paid such persons. The 
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Dun and Bradstreet and Oklahoma employers estimate increases 
in their apprentice e~ployment of 35 and 139 percent 
! 
~ 
respectively. Perhapjs the greater percentage increase 
I 
indicated by the Okla,!homa employers can be partially 
i . . 
! 
explained by the natu~e of the Dun and Bradstreet and 
Oklahoma firms which provided estimates on the effect of a 
wage tax credit on their apprentice employment. The 17 Dun 
and Bradstreet firms were all large firms in which probably 
only a small percent of the entry level jobs involve training 
in a formal apprenticeship program. In contrast, the 16 
Oklahoma firms were small firms (e.g., machine shops, 
printing offices, and construction firms) of the type that 
probably train under a formal apprenticeship program a 
significant percentage of their new employees. The greater 
availability of nonapprentice entry level jobs in the Dun 
and Bradstreet firms may be a reason why these firms 
estimate a lower percentage increase in their apprentice 
employment than the Oklahoma firms. By placing the 
disadvantaged individuals hired as a result of a wage tax 
credit in nonapprentice entry level jobs the Dun and 
Bradstreet firms would still be entitled to a tax credit, 
but would avoid the higher costs training under an 
apprenticeship program would most likely entail. Also, the 
results in Table XVII, which indicate that the estimated 
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percentage increase in apprentice employment will be 
greater for the Oklahoma firms than for the Dun and 
Bradstreet firms, are consiste~t with the estimates in 
Table XII of this chapter, which indicate that a wage tax 
credit will cause a greater percentage increase in overall 
employment by the Oklahoma firms. It is logical to expect 
that the greater percentage increase in overall employment 
estimated by the Oklahoma firms (possibly explained by 
greater participation of large f i_rms; i.e., Dun and 
Bradstreet, in the JOBS program) 15 would also be 
reflected by higher estimates from the Oklahoma employers 
on the effect of a tax credit on apprentice employment. 
The results in Table XVII do indicate, however, that 
both large and small employers are willing to provide 
meaningful training for disadvantaged persons which 
would.be hired under a tax credit program. 
Summary 
The findings reported in this chapter relate to 
employers' numerical estimates on criteria for determining 
employer eligibility for a human resource tax credit, and 
the potential effectiveness of a tax credit on the employ-
ment of the disadvantaged. On the basis of the findings 
reported in the preceding pages there is some reason to 
believe that: 
15 
Supra, p. 109. 
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(1) A single maximum acceptable employee turnover rate 
may be suitable as an employer eligibility requirement for 
a human resource tax credit for firms diverse as to size and 
business activity, since firm size and business activity do 
not appear to be significant factors affecting employers' 
estimates on what would constitute a fair maxtmum turnover 
rate. 
(2) Employers are willing to accept a reasonably 
.stringent employee turnover rate as a human resource tax 
credit employer eligibility requirement. 
(3) Employers generally feel that a 12 month period 
is a sufficient length of time for including the wages paid 
eligible employees in the base of a human resource tax 
credit. 
(4) Firm size or business activity do not have a 
significant effect on the period of time employers feel 
wages paid eligible employees should be included in a human 
resource tax credit base. 
(5) The tax credit rate on wages at which the largest 
number of employers will decide to hire tax credit employees 
is 50 percent. 
(6) Firm size and business activity do not have a 
significant effect on the tax credit rate at which employers 
will decide to hire tax credit employees. 
(7) 100 percent is the tax credit rate on relocation 
costs at which the greatest frequency of empl6yers feel 
their decision to pay such costs for disadvantaged 
individuals will be affected. 
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(8) Firm size and business activity do not have a 
significant effect on the tax credit rate at which employers 
will decide to pay relocation costs for disadvantaged 
individuals. 
(9) 100 percent is the tax credit rate on educational 
costs at which the greatest frequency of employers feel 
their decision to pay such costs for their disadvantaged 
employees will be affected. 
(10) firm size and business activity do not have a 
significant effect on the tax credit rate at which employers 
will decide to pay educational costs for their disadvantaged 
employees. 
(11) Depending on the magnitude of the tax credit 
rate, large employers (represented by the Dun and Bradstreet 
firms) might increase their employee ranks by 0.11 to 0.90 
percent with disadvantaged persons if granted a tax credit 
on the wages paid such persons. 
(12) Depending on the magnitude of the tax credit 
rate, small employers (represented by the Oklahoma firms) 
might increase their employee ranks by 0.63 to 8.54 percent 
with disadvantaged persons if granted a tax credit on the 
wages paid such persons. 
(13) The nationwide demand for tax credit employees 
as a result of a tax credit on wages might rang~ from 291 
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thousand individuals at a 10 percent tax credit rate to 
4,131 thousand individuals at a 100 percent tax credit rate. 
(14) A human resource tax credit might result in an 
income tax revenue loss during the first 12 month period 
it is effective of from $116 million at a 10 percent tax 
credit rate to $37,960 million at a 100 percent tax credit 
rate. 
(15) The income tax revenue loss resulting from a 
human resource tax credit at tax credit rates of 50 percent 
or less might be more than offset by reduced welfare and 
unemployment benefits and by additional F.I.C.A. and 
unemployment tax collections. 
(16) Once the employer's threshold rate for 
participation in a human resource tax credit is reached, a 
higher tax credit rate might not be effective in encouraging 
the employer to hire additional tax credit employees. 
(17) Employers are willing to provide meaningful 
training for the tax credit individuals they employ. 
CHAPTER VI 
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The purpose of this study was to gain insight into 
employers' attitudes on the nature and potential effec-
tiveness of a human resource tax credit incentive for 
expanded employment and training of the disadvantaged 
by private business firms. Information was obtained 
from employers on the feasibility and potential effect 
of including in the tax credit base education costs, 
relocation ~xpenses, and wages paid individuals certified 
by local employment security offices as being eligible 
for tax credit employment. In addition, employers 
provided data on the magnitude of the credit rate 
necessary to affect their decision to hire, relocate, 
and provide educational opportunities for disadvantaged 
individuals they employ. Employers also provided 
estimates on the effect of a wage tax credit on their 
employment. These estimates provided a basis for 
estimating the potential effect of a human resource tax 




Limitations of Study 
It is felt that this study has generated meaningful 
data on the desirability~ nature, and potenti~l effective-
ness of a human resource tax credit. However, this study 
was limited in that it included only the demand side of the 
labor market for disadvantaged individuals. No attempt 
was made to evaluate the effectiveness of government 
agencies in identifying individuals eligible for tax credit 
employment. This study was also limited in that it did 
not attempt to measure the relative administrative efficiency 
of a tax credit financial incentive versus a direct expen-
diture incentive. Also, this study .contains only empirical 
data from employers on the desirability, feasibility, and 
potentiai effectiveness of a human resource tax credit. No 
attempt was made to directly measure the attitudes of 
government or union officials on the use of a tax credit to 
provide jobs for the disadvantaged. 
Data Collection 
This study utilized a mail questionnaire in order ·to 
obtain insight into the following questions: 
1. What type of financial incentive for employing 
and training disadvantaged individuals is 
preferred by employers? 
2. What are employers' attitudes on the inclu-
sion of wages, relocation costs , and 
educational costs in the tax credit base? 
3. What are employers' attitudes on potential 
employer abuse of a human resource tax credit? 
4. Do employers feel it would be feasible and 
effective to establish a maximum acceptable 
employee turnover ratio as an eligibility 
requirement for a human resource tax credit? 
5. Is firm size or business activity a factor 
affecting the attitudes of employers on the 
desirability and nature of a human resource 
tax credit? 
6. What maximum employee turnover rate would be 
fair as an employer eligibility requirement 
for a human resource tax credit? 
7. If a tax credit is granted on wages paid 
disadvantaged employees, over what length 
of time should the wages paid such employees 
be included in the tax credit base? 
8. What magnitude of credit rates are necessary 
in order for a tax credit to have an effect 
on the employment, relocation, and education 
of disadvantaged individuals? 
9. What is the potential effect of alternative 
tax credit rates on the employment of 
disadvantaged individuals? 
10. What is the potential tax revenue loss of 
alternative tax credit rates? 
11. Are the employment plans of employers flexible 
enough so that they could be adjusted to take 
into account monthly changes in the tax credit 
rate? 
12. Will employers provide meaningful on-the-job 
training for the tax credit employees? 
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The questionnaire was mailed to presidents of 250 firms 
selected randomly from the Dun and Bradstreet Reference 
Book of Corporate Management 1970 for companies with $20 
million or more in sales and (or) 1,000 or more employees 
and to presidents 0£ 250 Oklahoma firms selected randomly 
from the Oklahoma Directory of Manufacturers and Products. 
Answers to the questionnaire were received from 45.4 percent 
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of the firms surveyed. In addition, another 3.2 percent 
of the firms (16 firms) responded without filling out the 
questionnaire. ~ine of the firms which did not fill out 
the questionnaire did, however, add comments pertinent to 
the survey. In all,·responses were received from 124 (49.6 
percent) Oklahoma firms and 119 (47.6 percent) Dun and 
Bradstreet firms. 
Analysis of Data 
The study data were analyzed for the overall Dun and 
Bradstreet and Oklahoma samples and for subsamples of these 
firms. The subsamples of Dun and Bradstreet firms were 
determined by classifying respondents according to the 
standard industrial classification code into the following 
four categories: manufacturing, wholesale-retail, utility-
transportation, and financial. The subsamples of Oklahoma 
firms were determined by classifying the respondents 
according to principal product, as identified in the 
Oklahoma Directory of Manufacturers and Products. The firms 
were classified into the following four categories: 
construction, industrial, food, and miscellaneous. 
The study generated both ordinal and ratio data. The 
ordinal data obtained in this study related to employers' 
attitudes on the desirability and nature of a human resource 
tax credit. Such data were analyzed by tabulating frequency 
and percentage distributions of the responses from the 
different types of Dun and Bradstreet and Oklahoma firms. 
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The ordinal data from each sample and subsample were also 
tested against null hypotheses specifying that the measured 
attitudes of different types of employers are not statis~ 
tically different. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov one-sample 
statistical test was used to test these hypotheses. 
Th~ ratio data in this study consisted of employers' 
estimates related to employer eligibility and base criteria; 
the magnitude of tax credit rates on wages, relocation 
costs, and education costs; and the potential effect of a 
tax credit on the firm's employment. Ratio data related 
.to employer eligibility and base criteria and tax credit 
rates were analyzed by tabulating frequency and percentage 
distributions and means for the samples and subsamples of 
Dun and Bradstreet and Oklahoma firms. In addition, the 
ratio data were tested against null hypotheses specifying 
that there are no significant differences between the Dun 
and Bradstreet and Oklahoma firms and among subsamples of 
these firms. The t test and the F test were used to test 
these hypotheses. Ratio data on the potential effect of a 
tax credit were anlayzed by relating the data. to national 
statistics on employment in order to estimate the potential 
effect of alternative tax credit rates on the nation's 
employment and on income tax revenue. 
Summary of Research Results 
Employers' opinions relating to the desirability of 
a human resource ta:X credit show that 75 percent of the 
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national firms responding and 82 percent of the respondent 
Oklahoma firms prefer a tax credit method of reimbursement 
over contractual reimbursement for employing disadvantaged 
individuals. 
With regard to the nature of a human resource tax 
credit most responding employers, regardless of their size 
or the nature of their business, think a tax credit based 
on wages could be feasible and effective in encouraging 
increased employment of disadvantaged individuals. Also, 
most small firms responding to the research instrument 
think a tax credit on costs incurred to relocate disadvan-
taged individuals from a labor surplus area to the 
employer's labor market area could be a feasible and 
effective device for encouraging employers to pay such 
costs. Responses from the large national firms indicate 
these firms are divided in their opinions on the feasibility 
and effectiveness of a tax credit on relocation costs~ 
Most of the responding employers from all types of 
firms do feel, however, that a tax· credit on educational 
costs paid .for disadvantaged individuals could be a 
feasible and effective device for encouraging employers 
to pay such costs. 
Most. of the responding employers feel that employers 
would not abuse a tax credit incentive, intended to increase 
employment of disadvantaged individuals, by replacing 
regular employees with tax credit employees. In connection 
with basing employer eligibility for a human resource tax 
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credit on a maximum acceptable employee turnover ratio in 
order to limit possible employer abuse of the credit, most 
of the large national firms responding are against such a 
criterion while responding small firms are somewhat 
uncertain as to the feasibility and effect of using 
employee turnover as a criterion for employer eligibility. 
Employers' estimates on the magnitude of tax credit 
employer eligibility and base period criteria for a tax 
credit on wages indicate that a single maximum acceptable 
employee turnover rate may be suitable as an employer 
eligibility requirement for firms diverse as to size and 
business activity and that employers are willing to accept 
a reasonably stringent employee turnover rate as a human 
resource tax credit employer eligibility requirement. With 
regard to the base period, the responding employers 
generally feel that a 12 month period is a sufficient length 
of time for including the wages paid eligible employees 
in the base of a human resource tax credit. Also, firm size 
or business activity do not appear to have a significant 
effect on the period of time employers feel wages paid 
eligible employees should be included in a human resource 
tax credit base. 
The estimates of responding employers show that the 
threshold tax credit rate on wages at which .the largest 
number of employers feel their decision to hire the 
disadvantaged will be affected is 50 percent. The threshold 
rates at which the largest number of responding employers 
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feel their decision to pay relocation and education 
expenses for disadvantaged employees will be affected is 
100 percent. Firm size and business activity do not appear 
to have a significant effect on the tax credit rates at 
which employers will decide to hire the disadvantaged and 
pay their relocation and education expenses. 
Estimates from responding employers on the employment 
effect of a human resource tax credit on wages at tax 
credit rates ranging from 10 to 100 percent indicate that 
large employers (represented by Dun and Bradstreet firms) 
might increase their employee ranks by 0.11 to 0.90 percent 
with disadvantaged persons and that small employers 
(represented by the Oklahoma firms) might increase their 
employee ranks by 0.63 to 8.54 percent. These estimates 
when related to national statistics on the labor force 
indicate that nationwide demand for tax credit employees 
as a result of a tax credit on wages might range from 
291 thousand individuals at a 10 percent credit rate to 
4,131,000 individuals at a 100 percent credit rate. These 
estimates on employment provide a basis for estimating 
that the loss in income tax revenue during the first 12~ 
month period a human resource tax credit is effective might 
range from $116 million at a 1-0 percent tax credit rate to 
$37,960 million at a 100 percent tax credit rate. However, 
the loss in income tax revenue resulting from a human 
resource tax credit at rates of 50 percent or less might. 
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be more than offset by reduced welfare and unemployment 
benefits and by additional F.I.C.A. and unemployment tax 
collections. 
Employers' estimates on effect of monthly changes in 
the tax credit rate indicate that once the employer's 
threshold rate for participation in a human resource tax 
credit is reached, a higher tax credit rate might not be 
effective in encouraging the employer to hire additional 
tax credit employees. Also, employers' estimates on the 
effect of a tax credit on wages on their apprentice 
employment indicate that employers are willing to provide 
meaningful training for the tax credit individuals t~ey 
employ. 
Conclusions 
On the b~sis of the research findings, it is concluded 
that more business firms will participate in the employment 
and training of the disadvantaged under a tax credit 
financial incentive than under a financial incentive invol-
ving a government contract. The findings indicate that 
the administrative simplicity of the reimbursement method 
does have a significant effect on the decision of employers 
to employ the disadvantaged. 
Although employers generally think tax credits on 
relocation.costs and educational costs can be feasible and 
effective, the magnitude of the tax credit which. they will 
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require to pay such costs makes it doubtful whether this 
is the most efficient way to provide disadvantaged persons 
with relocation and. educational opportunities. 
If we can accept employers' attitudes on their actions, 
then there is reason to believe that a tax credit would not 
be subject to "wide-scale" employer. abuse as some people 
fear. Even though a control device to prevent employer 
abuse may not be necessary, the findings do indicate that 
it is feasible to establish a single maximum acceptable 
employee turnover rate as a tax credit eligibility require-
ment for diverse business firms. 
The findings of this study provide support for the use 
of a 12-month base period for a tax credit on wages paid 
disadvantaged employees. Thus, it is concluded that 
Congress acted correctly in selecting 12 months as the base 
period for the work incentive tax credit. The results of 
this study do indicate, however, that the 20 percent tax 
credit rate of the work incentive tax credit is not a 
sufficient inducement for most employers to employ 
individuals eligible for the tax credit. Employers' 
estimates show that a human resource tax credit, depending 
on the size of the credit rate, can have a significant 
impact on employment of the disadvantaged in the United 
States. Moreover, it can be expected that at least some of 
the disadvantaged individuals hired as a result of the tax 
credit will be given meaningful job training; e.g., training 
under a formal apprenticeship program. 
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Recorcunendations 
The following recorcunendations are made on the basis 
of the research results of this study: 
(1) On the assumption increased employment is a 
desired objective, it is recorcunended that a human resource 
tax credit similar to the work incentive credit be a part 
of the income tax law. The results of this study clearly 
show that employers prefer this type of incentive for 
employing the disadvantaged. Consequently, it is felt that 
more disadvantaged individuals will be hired under a tax 
credit approach than would be hired under a direct expend-
iture approach; e.g., the JOBS program. 
(2) Consideration should be given by Congress and the 
Administration to increasing the rate of the work incentive 
tax credit above 20 percent. The results of this study 
. . . 
show that most employers feel that a credit rate higher 
than 20 percent is necessary in order for them to be attrac-
ted to a tax credit program for employing the disadvantaged. 
(3) Additional research should be undertaken into 
the possible use of a tax credit pegged to rise and fall 
with changes in an indicator of economic activity; e.g., 
the unemp~oyment rate. Although employers indicate that 
their employment plans may not be significantly changed as 
a result of monthly changes in the ral.e of a human resource 
tax credit, t:he data of this study show that more employers 
will participate in the tax credit program as the credit 
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rate is increased. Theoretically, a credit rate set to 
rise and fall with changes in an indicator of economic 
activity would act as an automatic stabilizer in the eccnomy. 
For example, if the credit rate is set to change withchanges 
in the unemployment rate, as the unemployment rate goes up 
resulting in a higher tax credit rate more individuals 
would be employed as a result of increased employer 
participation in the tax credit program. This in turn 
should cause the unemployment rate to go back down. Further 
research should be undertaken to determine whether such an 
automatic stabilizer would be feasible and effective. 
(4) Investigations should also be made to determine 
to what extent, if any, employers may be abusing the work 
incentive tax credit by replacing regular employees with 
individuals eligible for the work incentive tax credit. 
Research should also be undertaken on the effect of the 
work incentive tax credit recapture provision on employers' 
willingness to take advantage of the tax credit through the 
employment of the disadvantaged. If research shows that 
present control procedures to prevent employer abuse of the 
tax credit are inadequate, then additional study of the 
turnover requirement suggested in this report is recommended. 
(5) It is also recommended that research be undertaken 
on other uses of a tax credit to accomplish.social and 
economic objectives. For example, studies could be under-
taken to determine the potential of the tax credit approach 
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as an incentive for business firms to install pollution 
·control devices. 
(6) Research should be undertaken to determine 
whether the benefit of the work incentive tax credit is 
(or should be) allocated to business segments in connection 
with internal reporting. In discussing the receptiveness 
of business executives to a human resource tax credit, 
Holland indicates that a failure of accountants to allocate 
the benefit of a tax credit to the financial statements of 
individual segments of large companies for which consoli-
dated tax returns are filed might be a factor causing the 
managers of the individual segments to be hesitant to 
take advantage of a tax credit program. 1 It makes sense 
that a division manager would be somewhat reluctant to 
incur extra costs to hire disadvantaged persons if the tax 
credit benefit resulting from his efforts is not allocated 
to his division. Research should be undertaken.to determine 
whether the accounting treatment of tax credit benefits does 
affect the decision of managers to take actions which will 
give rise to a tax credit. 
(7) Finally, since this study is a normative and 
predictive study on the use and effect of a human resource 
tax credit, it is suggested that an "after the fact" 
1oaniel M. Holland, "An Evaluation of Tax Incentives 
for On-The-Job Training of the Disadvantaged," The Bell 
Journal of Economics and Mahagement Science, II (Spring, 
1971), p. 318. 
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evaluation of the Work Incentive Program Credit be 
undertaken. Data obtained in such a study could be related 
to the employers' estimates in this study. Such a study 
should be extremely helpful in providing insight into the 
reliability that can be put on predictive economic studies 
based on employers' estimates of.their future actions. 
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QUESTIONNAIRE 
· The following statements and questions relate. to proposc~d inComc tax credits on wages, 
moving expense~\, anJ ctlucat1.onal costs paid py employers to or for :fnJivlduals certi-
fied as "hard core" or disatlVantaged by local employment security offices. --
Please mark next to each of the following six st.:i.tm:1Pnts a number from tlw scale 
below which best ex.presses your agrecmi?nt or disagi-ecmcnt with the statement. 
__ l. 
__ 2. 
+J: strong agreement 
+2: mod~rate agreement 
+l: slight agreement 
-1: slight disagreement 
-2: modcrate disaere~~mcnt 
~3: strong disagreement 
An income tax credit on ~ages p31d cer.~~-f_!f'd nc>w employt?cs could be a feasible 
and effective dcvict~ for encouraging inct"C,lSl'd ~mployment of such individuals. 
Your firm would be more inclined to employ certified individuals if granted 
a tax credit providi1~n r~imburscment of arcrcentage of their Wdges than if 
requircJ to enter int..:.1 a formal contract wJ th the government in ordt.:r to re-
ceive a r1.·imburscmcnt of a.n eqt1ivalent a:nount. 
__ 3. A tax er.edit ori the cost incurred by e.mpJoyers to relocate certifted employees 
from a labor surplus arC!a to the employer's labor market area could be a 
feasible and effective device for encouraging CC!.ployers to pay such expenses. 
4. An income tax credit on tuition paid colleges and trade schools, books, and 
other educational e:-::pcnses could be a feJsible rtnd effective device for 
encouraging eoployers to pay such expens~s for certified individuals. 
__ 5. If granted a tax credit to h:f.re. certified individuals, employers would abuse 
the crC>dit b)" replacing regular employees with tax credit employees. 
___ 6. A fc>asihle and effectiv~ device for preventing the above type of employer abuse 
would be to grant the tax credit only to employers with an employee turnover 
rate below a specified maxlrnum. 
Please circle or supply the 1,umher ask~~d for in responding to the items below. Since we 
are i.ntercsted in the trend o[ ~h1..' co171bhH~d estim.it,.'~~ of all. responJents, it is important 
that you answer the questions evt.'.n though some of the cstir.rntes r.1ay involve considerable 
judgment. 
1. What is your present full time employment? ------ persons 
2. What maximum turnover rate (disc.hnries, quits, etc. as a percent of average em.-
plo>,nent for the year) do you feel Wl'n.ld he f,1ir os an employer eligibility 
re.quircment for the above tax cr1.•.<lits1 _____ . __ X 
3. Over what_ length of time should wages paid new certified employees be covered by 
an income tax crcdi t? 6 months 1 y~ar 1 ~ years 2 years 
4. What percent of wages would a tax cr£•dit haVe to be in order for it to affect 
your decision to employ certified individuals? % 
5. Estimate the number of certified ind lviduals your firm might add to its present 
employment if granted a taX credit (or the length of time and rate you have 
indicated in the pre~e"ding questions- persons 
6. Your ernployme{lt plans are flexible.enough so.that a significant increase in the 
magnitude of a wJge tax credit in one month could have an effect~number 
of certified unemploycJ individualf; your firm would add to its payroll in .the 
following month, 
l. Strongly agree 2. Agree J. Uncertain 4. Disagree 5. Strongly disagree 
7. What percent would a tax credit on tuition, hooks, etc., have to be in order for 
it to affect your decision to pay suc.h costs for certified employees? ____ % 
8. What percent would a tax credit on ·relocation expenses ha'1e to he in order for 
it to affect ynur deci.sion to pay such expenses for certified employees? ___ % 
Answer qut.,stiC':is 9 ,1nd 10 :if your firm has a rcgU.tcrNI apprenticeship tra:f.ning program". 
9. Ho"'' many in,iividuaJs do you currently havt.~ c11rullcd in re.gistere.d apprenticeship 
pror,r~ms? persons 
10. How m,1ny ct.•rt t(il"'d inJl\•idual:-1 would you .:i.dd to yo11r ·apprentic~ship program(&) if 
granted n tax cr\'dil cf the rate indicAtc•d fn quf'!aic,n ~ on the wageR pa.id such 
pi?nh.,n.-1 during t.h~ir arprcntice trairiin~";' ------ persons 
Plen~C' use the r1.•ver:::c stde c,r .r:(•p;ir.,tc stA:tioncry for .:my _c-omments you may wish to make 
on the tax c·rcdlt~ prnp,)scd :1b,·v~. 
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L. ·-·-··'.~ 
Oklahoma State University 
COLLEGE OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION I STILLWATER, OKLAHOMA 74074 (40.5) 372-6211, EXT. 258 
You are no doubt awar.e of the fact that income tax credits have 
been proposed as financial incentives for creating·jobs in private 
industry. Tax credits on wages paid eligible employees and on other 
related costs have received attention in the Congress and have been· 
discussed in Presidential task force reports. We would like your 
opinions on the feasibility and potential effectiveness of such tax 
credits in connection with a study currently being conducted at 
Oklahoma State University. The. results of this study will be made 
available to members of Congress and to officials in the Executive 
Branch of the government. 
A tax credit, in contrast to a deduction or an expense, is a 
direct offset to a computed tax liability. If granted the tax 
credits currently being studied,'firms would still be allowed to 
deduct as business expenses the full cost of the items upon which 
the credit is based . 
We wili be.very grateful if you will take a few minutes to complete 
the enclosed form. Your response will make a most important contri-
bution to the validity of this study. If your identity is revealed, 
it will be held in the strictest confidence. 
Sincerely, 
Robert Van. Regenmorter 
Project Dirz~  
~:~r~:onomic, 
and Director, Manpower Research 
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Oklahoma State University 
COLLEGE OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION 
June 11, 1971 
I STILLWATER, OKLAHOMA 74074 (405) 372-6211, EXT. 258 
You were recently asked for your opinions on the potential effect 
of granting income tax credits to employers as a means of combating 
the Nation's problem of high unemployment and excessive welfare 
rolls. You, as an employer, are in the best position to provide 
meaningful opinions on whether the granting of income tax credits 
on wages paid eligible employees represents a better approach for 
increasing employment than direct subsidies under formal govern-
mental contracts. A high response from employers selected to 
participate in this study is crucial in order for the study to be 
meaningful. If your firm has not already returned the form pre-
viously mailed, we will be very grateful if you or an appropriate 
person in your firm will. take about five minutes to complete the 
enclosed copy. 
Since your opinions are to be used strictly for an overall statis-
tical tabulation of results, it is not necessary for you to reveal 
your identity on the enclosed form. If you have already partici-
pated in this survey, we sincerely thank you for your cooperation. 
Sincerely, 
Robert Van Regenmorter 
Resea['°t 11~ 
J Im C. Shaarev. 
rofessor of Economics and Director, 
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L~,, .. -·'···-•"1 
Oklahoma State University 
COLLEGE OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION 
June 28, 1971 
I STILLWATER, OKLAHOMA 74074 (405) 372-6211, EXT. 258 
The cooperation of you or an appropriate person in your firm is vital in 
order for me _to complete my Ph.D. dissertation on manpower income tax 
credits. Many legislators have speculated on the type of financial incen-
tive employers would prefer for employing disadvantaged individuals. Even 
if your firm is currently not in the position to employ such persons, the 
response of your firm is most important to the success of my study which 
is attempting to obtain concrete information on the attitudes of a repre-
sentative cross section of employers toward specified tax credits. It is 
felt that the statistical tabulation of the results of this study will 
provide much needed information on the pros and cons of manpower income 
tax credits before tax laws are ~nacted based on as.sumptions of legis-
lators regarding employers' attitudes. 
As indicated abovei your responses are to be used only for a statistical 
tabulation. Therefore, your firm will not be identified individually 
with the study results. If you would like a summary of the results, 
please mail back this cover letter with your completed questionnaire or 
in a separate envelope. 
Sincerely, 
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